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The first of two essays examines whether financial reporting is influenced when a 
firm shares a director with a “central” firm. Central firms are those which are well-
connected within the network of firms formed by shared board of directors. Centrality 
is a driver of influence and since social networks are a channel to spread information, 
central firms could transmit reporting practices. However, because financial reporting 
style is presumably firm specific, the central firm’s reporting may not be effective for 
a focal firm. I examine the effect of central firm conservatism and discretionary 
accruals on the same focal firm attributes. The results show that focal firm 
conservatism is influenced by that of the central firm after the two firms become 
interlocked and that influence is concentrated in the first year. However, a firm 
adopted central firm discretionary accruals over a longer time horizon. The finding 
was robust to a variety of alternate explanations. Overall, the findings shed light on 
  
how financial reporting spreads through a network and adds to our understanding of 
how influence occurs between two interlocked firms. 
The second essay examines municipal reporting manipulation. Municipalities use 
fund accounting to separately track each activity in self-balancing set of accounts. I 
focus on the general fund, the largest fund, which uses governmental accounting, and 
the enterprise fund, which accounts for business-like operations and uses corporate-
like accounting. Municipalities have a different organizational objective than 
corporations and could desire to report a small increase in the general fund bottom 
line to avoid taxpayer’s backlash or they could wish to build up their fund balance to 
for future use. The enterprise fund incentives are also unclear. I find that operating 
transfers between funds (discretionary accruals) are used in the general (enterprise), 
but not the enterprise (general), fund to systematically manipulate its bottom line 
downward. Accordingly, each fund is manipulated downwards using a method that is 
in line with its accounting system. Further analysis shows that the general fund results 
are more pronounced in municipalities with heavy citizen involvement. The findings 
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Essay 1: Central Influences: The Effect of Being Interlocked to 
a Central Firm 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Directors often serve on multiple boards and two firms with the same director are 
linked by what is commonly known as a board interlock. Through these interlocks, a 
corporate director network forms and naturally some firms will become more central 
in the network due to greater connectedness. Because central firms are more 
connected, they are often more influential and prestigious within the network (Davis, 
1991). Given that central firms can be influential, this study examines whether the 
financial reporting- specifically conservatism and discretionary accruals- of a firm 
linked to a central firm, the focal firm, is influenced by the reporting style of the 
central firm. 
Prior literature has documented the effect board interlocks have on firm decisions. 
One group of papers has focused on adoption decisions. For example, firms are more 
likely to adopt a poison pill or expense stock options if they are interlocked with a 
firm that previously began that practice (Davis, 1991 and Reppenhagen, 2010). 
Another set of papers focus on more common, on-going practices. They find, among 
other things, that firms that interlocked firms have similar political contributions 
(Mizruchi, 1992), compensation packages (Wong and Gygax, 2007) and effective tax 
rates (Brown and Drake, 2011). 
However, prior literature has rarely differentiated between the two interlocked firms. 
Since board interlocks form the overall corporate network, firm centrality is an 




difference, central firms in my sample had 17.1 interlocks compared to 4.8 interlocks 
of non-central firms. Central firms also utilize their additional information to discover 
and adopt innovations faster (Bell, 2005). Central firms also enjoy lower cost of debt 
(Chuluumn et al, 2011) and superior performance (Larcker et al, 2011).  
This tremendous informational advantage elevates the prestige and influence of the 
central firm (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). Prior literature has documented that 
network centrality is a main driver of influence in terms of behavior and performance 
(Huanchild and Beckman, 1998) which is why institutional theory suggests that the 
practices of central firms are well positioned to be copied by other firms (DiMaggio 
and Powel, 1983) to gain legitimacy. Additionally, since managers are constantly in 
pursuit of more information to improve decision making (Rogers, 2003) and central 
firms represent a wealth of quality information regarding policies and practices, 
information coming from central firms could be especially valuable. 
Still, there are at least two prominent reasons why focal firm financial reporting might 
not be influenced by the central firm. First, accounting is an on-going process and its 
financial reporting tends to be steady over time (Givoly et al, 2007). So while a firm 
might seek counsel from its interlocked partners on infrequent decisions, it 
presumably has set practices for financial reporting that it has been following for 
years. Therefore, a firm might be less inclined to imitate that of the central firm even 
after being exposed to its reporting. Second, unlike the “on-going” actions that are 
affected by board interlocks, financial reporting is unique to firm characteristics. An 
accounting system maps a firm’s economic events into financial statements 




firms (Larcker et al 2011), a focal firm may not emulate the central firm reporting 
practices because those practices that help a central firm report its superior 
performance might not be suitable to help a focal firm report its performance.  
I examine the effect of a central tie on financial reporting with respects to 
conservatism and discretionary accruals. Conservatism deals with the timeliness of 
reporting news and is seen as one of the “most influential principles” in accounting 
(Watts, 2003a) and discretionary accruals have been widely used in the literature to 
capture reporting quality (Dechow et al, 2010). I use three measures of conservatism: 
the C-Score which is firm-specific measure based on the Basu (1997) model, non 
operating accruals and Book to market. I capture discretionary accruals with the Jones 
Model and a variation of it.  
Drawing on social network theory, I estimate four measures of firm centrality for 
each year based on director connections. I aggregate all the measures and identify 
central firms as those in the top quintile of each year. Then, I code all the firms linked 
to a central firm each year. Through a difference in difference approach, I compare 
the financial reporting of the focal firm in the period before and after they become 
tied to the central firm. I also conduct a similar test after the tie is broken to see if the 
influence persists. I also address endogeniety concerns usings a Heckman self 
selection model. This design, coupled with the endogeniety remedy, allows me to 
track the effect of central firms overtime and track the direction of causation within 
interlocks, something prior literature has not previously explored. 
I find that a focal firm conservatism is influenced by central firm conservatism after 




linked but the effect was concentrated in the first year of the tie. There was no effect 
affect on conservatism after the link was broken, suggesting the focal firm retained 
the central firm influence. I also find that focal firms do not to be influenced by 
central firm discretionary accruals when comparing focal firm reporting before and 
after the tie. However, I find some evidence suggesting that focal firms slowly adopt 
central firm discretionary accrual practices over a longer period of time.  
Additional analysis reveals that the reporting difference in conservatism between the 
focal and central firm declines after the tie. Also, firms with lower pre-tie 
conservatism or reporting quality than their central firm counterparts improve on each 
dimension after the tie. This indicates that the focal firm converges to the reporting of 
the central firm and supports the notion that central firms can spread their accounting 
practices through their network. 
The dichotomous set of results maybe rooted in the incentives to report conservatism 
and discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are “systematically tied to firm 
characteristics” and prior research suggests that “managerial intent affects the 
incidence and magnitude” of them (Dechow and Dichev, 2002 p.3). Because 
discretionary accruals are more firm-specific, it appears focal firms are more cautious 
to adopt these practices. Conservatism, on the other hand, arises from contractual 
arrangements, litigation concerns, taxes and regulation (Watts, 2003a) and is 
embedded in demands that are fairly common to all firms. Accordingly, this could 
explain why focal firms adopted central firm conservatism at a quicker pace. 
I also consider the alternate explanation that the central firm is only indirectly 




results are robust to this alternate explanation. I also address the possibility that my 
results are due to the natural flow of information in an interlock and not due to firm’s 
centrality and the potential for reverse causation. My results were robust to the size of 
the central firm, whether the focal and central firm shared an industry or auditor, and 
the position of the linking director at each firm among other things. Interestingly, I 
find some evidence that focal firms with independent boards were less likely to be 
influenced by central firm reporting.   
My paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I document that financial 
reporting is influenced by another firm, namely a central one. While there is a 
literature on the benefits of being a central firm and another about board interlocks, 
my paper merges the two streams. Secondly, the study also highlights how financial 
reporting practices can spread through a network setting. In this case, a central firm 
was spreading good reporting practices to its interlocks. Prior research has 
documented the effect of “contagion” in negative settings but this evidence suggests 
that good contagion is also possible. The findings add to our knowledge of factors 
that affect financial reporting.  
Third, I add to our understandings of networks. Specifically, whereas prior literature 
has used a longer horizon to determine the effect of networks, I show that central firm 
influence is concentrated in the first year. This furthers our understanding of how 
quickly networks can influence firm decisions and the persistence of such influence. 
Also, I provide evidence on causality within board interlocks. Prior studies have only 
shown a correlation between interlocked firms regarding certain practices. But 




firm’s practices influenced the other firm’s practices. This adds to our knowledge of 
how why interlocked firms may behave similarly. 
Fourth, I add to the literature about the differing incentives for conservatism and 
discretionary accruals. Although the evidence shows that both reporting features were 
influenced, they were affected in different times. Whereas conservatism was adopted 
immediately after the tie, the discretionary accruals influence happened over a longer 
horizon. This indicates that focal firms were more judicious about adopting practices 
that tend to be more firm-specific. 
Fifth, I add to the literature about conservatism. Prior studies have concluded that 
conservative reporting is “stable over time” (Louis et al, 2011). My findings suggest 
that firm conservatism can change in a short period.  Lastly, I add to literature on 
board independence.  I show that focal firms board independence were less likely to 
be influenced by central firm reporting. This adds to previous findings that board 
independence is an important feature in forming financial statements. 
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows: Chapter 2 presents the motivation, 













Chapter 2: Motivation 
2.1 Interlock Literature 
Board interlocks are formed when two firms share a director. Prior research has 
examined the effect of such interlocks. One group of papers examines the effect of 
interlocks on a binary decision. These studies have found that a focal firm is more 
likely to adopt poison pills, multidivional form, investor relations department, switch 
stock exchanges, expense stock options and adopt life insurance tax shelters if it is 
interlocked with a firm that previously adopted the practice (Davis, 1991, Palmer et 
al, 1993, Rao and Sivakumar, 1999, Rao et al, 2000, Reppenhagen, 2010 and Brown, 
2011). In addition, a focal firm increases its acquisition activity, engages in option 
backdating, has a restatement, is targeted for a private equity transaction and 
recognizes an impairment if it is interlocked with a firm that engaged or experienced 
the same event (Haunschild et al 1993, Chiu et al, 2013, Bizjak et al, 2009, Stuart and 
Yim, 2010 and Shepherdson, 2011). 
Another stream of papers has studied the impact of interlocks on more common, on-
going actions. Davison, Stening and Wai (1984) document a correlation between two 
firms interlocking and sharing an auditor. Interlocking firms also exhibit similarity in 
political contributions, (Mizruchi, 1992) and compensation packages (Wong and 
Gygax, 2007). In addition, firms with interlocking boards tend to have similar 
effective tax rates, implying that both firms engage in similar tax practices (Brown 
and Drake, 2011). Interlocking firms also have parallel types of investments and 




Interestingly, the literature does not differentiate between the two interlocked firms 
nor does it distinguish among the type of firms a focal firm is tied to. The interlock 
research dealing with the so-called binary outcomes only note a difference in the 
timing of action. However, understanding the differences between the focal firm and 
the firm it is linked to serves to provide a better picture of the interaction within the 
interlock. 
2.2 Central Firms 
 
An important dimension to explore within board interlocks is firm centrality. Within 
the corporate director network, some firms will emerge to better connected than 
others. The more connected a firm, the more central it is in the corporate network 
(Davis, 1991). Because they are well connected, central firms have access to more 
information and can better verify the information it receives (Bell, 2005). As a result, 
central firms become aware of innovations earlier and adopt them faster (Bell, 2005).  
Consequently, central firms are more likely to conduct acquisitions (Haunschild and 
Beckman, 1998) and form alliance partnerships (Gulati, 1999). They also have more 
profitable mergers (Harris and Shimizu, 2004). Central firms also have lower cost of 
debt because their informational advantage reduces information asymmetry 
(Chuluumn et al, 2011). Central firms translate their informational advantage into 
superior future performance (Larcker et al 2012). Central firms also reward their 
executives with higher compensation for their well connectedness and additional 
information sources (Brian et al 2001 and Barnea and Guedj, 2009).  Moreover, a 
central firm is more likely to adopt poison pills, presumably to protect its 




Bouwman (2011) finds that interlocking have similar governance structures, mainly 
because firms appoint directors from similar firms. However, that is unlikely to be the 
case in this setting since central firms differ from focal firms along dimensions of 
centrality and economic fundamentals. Firm centrality is therefore an important 
dimension of a firm and can help explain its behavior. Network centrality has been 
shown to be a driver of influence in terms of behavior and performance (Leavitt, 1951 
and Huanchild and Beckman, 1998). Meanwhile, central firms are viewed as being 
the “corporate elite” (Davis, 1991 p.592) and thus their policies are well-positioned to 
be copied by other firms. Accordingly, institutional theory suggests that a firm will 
imitate a prestigious firm to gain legitimacy (DiMagio and Powell, 1983).  
In addition, social network theory asserts that “economic agents are affected by their 
social networks” (Granottover, 1985). Rogers (2003) asserts that information can 
spread through a social network, provided it comes from a “high opinion leader.” 
Since central firms are densely connected, they retain a great deal of quality 
information regarding practices and policies. In addition, because managers attempt 
to gather more information for better decision-making (Rogers, 2003), information 
coming from a central firm would be valuable. Accordingly, given that practices that 
start at the center of a network spread faster (Davis and Greve, 1997), central firms, 
with their wealth of information, could have a role in spreading financial reporting 
styles. 
Since central firms tend to be more prestigious (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006) and 
have greater information, it is an empirical question whether a focal firm’s actions 




2.3 Financial Reporting 
However, there are reasons to believe a central firm would not impact focal firm 
reporting. First, financial reporting is conducted on a continuous basis. That is, a firm 
has its accounting system and reporting policies set prior to being linked to a central 
firm. Therefore, while prior literature documents that the focal firm is likely to seek 
counsel from its interlocked firms about adoption decisions that the interlocked firm 
previously deliberated, the focal firm might not need the same counsel regarding its 
routine reporting practices. Financial reporting tends to be stable over time (Givoly et 
al, 2007). Therefore, access to practices at a central firm may not influence the focal 
firm.   
In addition, accounting is different than other “on-going” firm policies which have 
been found to be similar in interlocking firms. Although prior research indicates that 
interlocked firms have similar capital investment, research and development, tax 
practices and compensation, these practices are continually revised with new 
information (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, Dennison, 2009, and Armstrong et al., 
2012). However, as stated above, accounting practices tend to be stable and additional 
information may not be helpful. 
Second, unlike the “on-going” actions that are affected by board interlocks, financial 
reporting is unique to firm characteristics. An accounting system maps a firm’s 
economic events into financial statements (DeFranco et al, 2011). Economic 
performance is underpinning the output of the accounting system, the financial 
statements. As Jensen (1983) explains, “accounting practices are affected by an 




superior financial performance and are economically different than other firms 
(Larcker et al 2012). Therefore, a focal firm may not emulate the central firm 
reporting practices because those practices that help a central firm report its superior 
performance might not be suitable to help a focal firm report its performance.  The 
discussions above leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: A focal firm’s financial reporting will move closer to that of the 
central firm after the link. 
Prior literature has examined the effect of interlocks after the link is established. 
However, few have studied the effect after the interlock ends. Therefore, if focal 
firms are mirroring the reporting style of central firms, then a natural question to ask 
is whether those changes persist over time. Stated differently, does the effect of the 
central firm endure after the link ends or does the focal firm revert back to its old 
style? This leads to the following: 
H2: A focal firm’s financial reporting will divert away from that of the 





Chapter 3: Design 
 3.1 Social Network Measures 
 
I measure centrality using four commonly used measures of social networks: degree, 
closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality. Degree is the sum of direct links a 
firm has to other firms. For example, if firm A is linked to 4 other firms via its 
directors, it would have a degree of four. In more formal terms, degree is defined as: 
  Σ   / 1  where xij is the number of links for firm i. Closeness, 
which accounts for direct and indirect links a firm may have, measures how quickly 
one firm can reach other firms. It is defined as the inverse of the average distance 
between one firm and another and is defined as: 
Σ ,  where C(i,j) is 
the shortest path between firm i and firm j. Accordingly, a firm with a higher 
closeness score can reach other firms quicker. 
Eigenvector centrality, sometimes referred to as connectivity, captures the quality of a 
firm’s links. Intuitively, being linked to other well connected firms enhances the 
centrality of the focal firm and therefore attempts to quantify influence in a network. 
Eigenvector centrality requires creating an n x n adjacency matrix A where Aij =1 if 
firm i and firm j are linked and 0 otherwise. Then, eigenvector centrality is calculated 
as: (A*Eigenvector) where eigenvector is the largest eigenvalue, , of A. 
Essentially, eigenvector centrality is a recursive measure of degree where centrality is 
the sum of links to other firms scaled by their respective centrality. 
Betweenness, which measures how often a firm is the intermediary between two other 




firm is more central if it lies on the path of the shortest distance between two other 
firms. Betweeness is calculated as:    Σ , , /  where Pi (kj) are 
the number of shortest paths between firm k and firm j that firm i lies on and P(kj) are 
the total shortest paths between firm k and firm j. All the centrality measures are 
normalized by the size of the network, which mitigates the concern that larger firms 
tend to be more central. 
 3.2 Sample Selection 
 
I gather information on firm directors from RiskMetrics for the period 1996-2006. I 
map the corporate network of directors for each year separately. Two firms are 
considered tied if they share a director in a given year. Using those board ties, I 
calculate the four centrality measures for each firm each year (Borgatti, Everett and 
Freeman, 2002). Then for each year, I sort each centrality measure by quintile and 
add up the four quintile rankings to form a Centrality Score for each firm. A firm in 
the top quintile of the Centrality Score is identified as a central firm for a particular 
year. Subsequently, I identify a “central tie” as occurring when a firm is tied to a 
central firm in year through a shared director.  
I create a variable that identifies the testing window around the first and last central 
tie for each firm. I code D_intoTie to equal 1 during the years of the central tie a firm 
has during the sample period and equal to 0 for an equal number of years before the 
tie is entered. D_OutofTie is coded 0 for the years during the tie and 1 for an equal 
number of years before the tie is exited. For example, firm A enters a central tie to 
firm B in year t and the link lasts for 3 years till t +2. So, D_intoTie would be coded 0 




be coded 1for t, t+1 and t+2 and 0 for t+3, t+4 and t+5. This methodology allows for 
within firm comparison and allows me to use the focal firm as its own control.  
As explained in Table 1, my initial sample of 9,207 firm-years is based on firms with 
financial information in COMPUSTAT. After eliminating firms that have no central 
tie, multiple central ties per year or central firms tied to other tied central firms, I am 
left with 1,462 firm-years, which form the basis for the two subsamples. The “in-tie” 
sample tests H1 and the “out-tie” sample tests H2. I eliminate all firms that have 
multiple central ties during the testing window or other central ties in the period when 
D_intoTie (D_OutofTie) = 0 (1). Essentially, each focal firm in the sample could only 
have one central tie for the sample period. These procedure ensures that the cleanest 
setting to test the effect of a central firm on a focal firm.       
These procedures result in 993 firm-years for the “in-tie” tests and 883 firm-years for 
the “out-tie” tests. Stated differently, I identify 339 (322) instances where a firm 
enters (exits) a central tie. Those central ties come 450 focal firms being linked to 232 
unique central firms. When I restrict my sample to observations of firms with a 
central tie and central firms, the sample is 2,605 firm-years.  
Table 2 illustrates presents the normalized means of the social network measures. The 
mean value of degree is .006, the mean of closeness is .363, the mean of eigenvector 
centrality is 2.574 and the mean of betweenness is .252. I conducted a t-test to 
compare each of the centrality measures of central and focal firms, finding that 
central firm have significantly larger values in each case (p-value =0.000). For 
emphasis, a focal firm is tied to, or has an un-normalized degree, of 4.8 other firms 




superior connectivity of central firms, but also provide evidence that the central firms 
identified by my methodology are indeed more central than other firms. 
 3.3 Research Design 
I examine the effect of a central tie on financial reporting. Specifically, I inspect the 
effect central firm reporting of conservatism and discretionary accruals has on focal 
firm reporting of those two items. Conservatism deals with the timeliness of reporting 
news and is seen as one of the “most influential principles” in accounting (Watts, 
2003a) and discretionary accruals have been widely used in the literature to capture 
reporting quality (Dechow et al, 2010).  
It is important to note that these two aspects of reporting are not similar. Earnings 
management, which discretionary accruals usually are trying to capture, occurs 
mainly due to market expectations and contractual incentives (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999). Discretionary accruals are “systematically tied to firm characteristics” and 
prior research suggests that “managerial intent affects the incidence and magnitude” 
of them (Dechow and Dichev, 2002 p.3). Conservatism on the other hand arises from 
contractual arrangements, litigation concerns, taxes and regulation (Watts, 2003a). 
Conservatism acts as a governance mechanism to protect the shareholder investments. 
Indeed, prior research has documented that conservative reporting protects 
shareholders (Louie et al, 2011 and Lafond and Watts, 2008). Whereas the use of 
discretionary accruals seems to depend on firm specific qualities, conservatism is 
rooted in demands that are fairly common to all firms.  
I measure conservatism using three different measures. First, I employ the C-score 




based on the Basu (1997) model of asymmetric timeliness. The Basu (1997) model is 
calculated as:      X β β D β R β D R  ε 
where X  is net income before extraordinary items, R is returns, D is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when R<0 and 0 otherwise. The good news timeliness measure is 
β3 and β4 is the asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good. The C-score is an 
estimate of β4, where each coefficient is specified with firm specific characteristics 
each year:  λ λ  Size λ  M/B λ  Lev  
The estimator i is constant across firms but varies across time since it is estimated in 
annual cross sections. The C-score also varies across firm due to the firm 
characteristics (Size, M/B and Leverage). Size is measured as the log of market value, 
M/B is the market to book ratio and Leverage is short term plus long term debt scaled 
by market value. The equation for the C-score is substituted into the Basu model and 
that expanded model is run in annual cross sections. I then calculate the C-score from 
that expanded model.  
The second firm specific measure of conservatism I use is non-operating accruals, 
ConAcc. Givoly and Hayn (2000) find that the pattern of non-operating accruals is 
consistent with the rise of conservative reporting over time. Non-operating accruals 
include such items as restructuring charges, loss on bad debt, gain or loss on asset 
sale, asset impairments, capitalization of expense and the deferral of revenue. ConAcc 
is total accruals less operating accruals scaled by lagged assets by -1, thereby making 




extraordinary items less cash flow from operations. Depreciation and operating 
accruals are subtracted from total accruals where operating accruals are the non-cash 
change in current assets less the change in current liabilities excluding short term 
debt.  
 Book to Market (ConBTM) is the last conservatism measure. It is defined as the ratio 
of book to market multiplied by -1 so larger values are more conservative. More 
conservative firms should have a lower book values compared to market value 
because they consistently defer gains but recognize losses (Ahmed and Duellman, 
2007).  
I measure discretionary accruals by employing the Jones Model where accruals are 
modeled as: 
,   =    + ∆ , ,  
TA is total accruals measured as income before extraordinary items minus cash flow 
from operations, change in revenue is revenue in year t less revenue in year t -1 and 
PPE is property, plant and equipment. All variables are scaled by lag assets. 
Discretionary accruals are calculated as the residual obtained from running the above 
regression on annual industry cross sections. I take the absolute value of the 
discretionary accruals, absJM. 
I also use the variation of the Jones Model suggested by Kothari et al (2004). This 
model includes for return on assets (ROA) to control for the relationship between 
accruals and firm performance. Discretionary accruals are derived in the same fashion 
and absolute values are taken, absJM_ROA. 




I test the effect of a central tie on focal firm reporting by employing a difference in 
difference model. I test the effect of the tie on reporting in the first year of the tie, the 
“in-tie,” compared to the previous year and then again with the last year of the tie, the 
“out-tie,” compared to the following year. This two step approach allows me to 
capture the effect of the central tie over the course of time. 
I test the impact of the central tie on accounting by comparing the time before (after) 
the tie to the time during the tie using the following regression: AcctMeasurei,t   β0  β1 AcctMeas_CFi,t  β2 D β3 D*AcctMeas_CFi,t  β4 Sizei,t‐1  β5 SizeCFi.t‐1  β6 M/Bi,t‐1   β7 Leveragei,t‐1  β8 Volatilityi,t‐1  β9 SalesGrowthi,t‐1   β10 CFOi,t  β11 Agei,t β12 Litigationi,t  β13 BigNi,t  β14SimilarSizei,t β15SameIndi,t  β16GeogProximityi,t  β17SameAuditori,t β18BoardIndepi,t   β19TieLengthi,t  β20BoardSizei,t   β21Fundingi,t   β22TangibleAssetsi,t   β23Degreei,t      ε     
AcctMeasure is the accounting variable in question and AccMeasureCF is the 
accounting measure of the central firm that the focal firm is tied to. D  is a dummy 
variable capturing the central tie. For the “in tie” tests,  D_intoTie equals 1 during the 
years of the central tie and 0 for an equal number of years before the tie is entered. 
D_OutofTie is coded 0 for the years during the tie and 1 for an equal number of years 
before the tie is exited. The β3 coefficient, the interaction term between D_intoTie 
(D_OutofTie)  and the central firm accounting, indicates the impact of the central 
firm’s accounting practices on the focal firm’s accounting during (after) the tie. 
Therefore, for “in tie tests” (“out tests”), a positive (negative) coefficient on β3 will 
indicate that relative to the years when the focal firm was not  (was) tied to the central 
firm, the focal firm’s reporting was impacted by the reporting of the central firm that 
of the central firm during (after) the tie. Accordingly, β3 is hypothesized to be positive 




I control for central firm size (SizeCF) to address the concern that larger firms tend to 
have greater centrality. I include the lag SizeCF since there could be correlation 
between the current year size of the central firm and either conservatism or 
discretionary accruals. I control for Size, M/B and Leverage because all three are 
associated with conservatism and discretionary accruals. In a short window, 
conservatism is dependent on prior year M/B (Roychowdhury & Watts, 2007) so I use 
lagged M/B as well as lagged Size and Leverage because Khan and Watts (2009) 
suggest controlling for the inputs to the C-score. I also control for other firm 
characteristics that could affect conservatism or discretionary accruals (CFO, 
volatility, age, Sales Growth). I control for high Sales Growth can also raise market 
expectations which could affect ConBTM (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). I also 
include a dummy variable Big N auditor and a dummy if the firm is in a litigious 
industry. When ConBTM is the dependent variable, I also include the current and six 
lagged period returns following Beaver and Ryan (2000). I control Board 
Independence and Board Size as each could affect reporting. I also include Funding, 
measured as retained earnings scaled by lag assets, Tangible Assets and Degree. 
Funding measures the capacity of intermal financing, which in turn affects likelihood 
of seeking external financing (Byrd and Miruchi, 2005) and could affect reporting. 
Firms with lower levels of Tangible Assets have increased information asymmetry 
problems which also could affect reporting. Degree controls for other non-central 
interlocks the firm may have and also controls for the focal firm’s own centrality. 
I additionally control for other types of links between the focal and the central firm 




Auditor are dummy variables coded 1 if the focal and central firm share an industry or 
auditor, respectively. Geog. Proximity is the log of distance in miles between focal 
and central firm while Tie Length is included to control for the possibility that 
influence could grow over time.  Industry fixed effects are included in each regression 
and standard errors are clustered by firm and year. 
 3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 Panel A provides descriptive statistics. Central firms are larger in Size and 
have higher M/B. The differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Central 
firms also have better performance that focal firms (CFO: .093 vs .086, t-stat = -2.05). 
The flip side is also true. Focal firms have more volatile returns (.010 vs .090, t-stat = 
9.22). These findings are consistent with Larcker et al, (2012) which documented that 
central firms are larger, have higher market values and better performance. This 
reinforces notion that central firms are able to use their informational advantage gain 
better performance. It also illustrates that central firms differ from focal firms not 
only in their network position, but also along performance and size.  
The C-Score, which measures the propensity to report bad news, had a mean of 0.065 
while the ConAcc had a mean of 0.57 and ConBTM had a mean of -0.475. Focal firms 
had higher values of C-Score (0.101 vs.0.011, t-stat = 11.12) but there was no 
statistical difference for ConAcc   between the two sets of firms. Interestingly, focal 
firms had a lower ConBTM (-0.514 vs. -0.414, t-stat =7.08). ConBTM, which is the 
book to market ratio multiplied by -1, indicates larger values to be more conservative. 
ConBTM also measures conservatism since firm inception (Ahmed and Duellman, 




result reflect the fact that central firms have had a longer time period to recognize 
increase their book value. This underscores the need to control for the lagged returns 
of prior six years in the ConBTM  models. 
The absolute value of discretionary accruals (absJM) is 0.029 with focal firms having 
a mean of 0.025 and central firms having an average of 0.020. The means for 
absJM_ROA is similar and the difference between focal and central firms is 
significant at the 1% level for both measures. These results are generally consistent 
with prior literature which finds that larger firms and better performing firms have 
lower levels of discretionary accruals and are less conservative (LaFond and Watts, 
2008 Kahn and Watts, 2009 and Hribar and Nichols, 2007). It also supports the 
notion that central firms have superior underlying fundamentals, which is translated 
differently through the accounting system in terms of discretionary accruals and 
conservatism.  
Panel B of Table 2 shows the accounting measures of the focal firms by each year of 
the tie. For the C-Score, there is a pattern of increase in most years after the tie and 
there is a significant difference between the C-Score before the tie and during the tie 
(t-stat = 3.05). ConAcc and ConBTM reveal that they steadily became more 
conservative over time, but at a statistically insignificant pace. Both discretionary 
accruals models show that firms seemed to maintain their levels of discretionary 
accruals for the first two years after the tie, and then decreased them. Though these 
figures were not statistically significant, they provide insight how and when the 




Table 3 displays the correlations among variables. Panel A shows that there is high 
correlation among the social network variables. Panel B generally confirms the 
descriptive statistics that Central Firms are larger, more profitable and have lower 
discretionary accruals and less conservatism. Although there is a positive correlation 
between Central Firm and ConBTM (.151), that could be explained by the positive 
correlation between Age and ConBTM (.289), suggesting older firms have higher 


















Chapter 4: Result 
4.1 Main Analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the main regression model. Each dependent variable is 
presented in two columns: first regressed on the dummy variable measuring the 
testing window, the central firm accounting variable in question, and the interaction 
term, then with the controls. The models include industry fixed effects and standard 
errors are clustered by firm and year. 
In Table 4A, columns 1-6 show that the interaction term between D_intoTie and the 
central firm conservatism is positive and significant in each specification. The only 
exception is column 1 where C-Score is regressed without controls and even then the 
t-statistic (1.62) is margninally insignificant. For some perspective, a 1% increase in 
the central firm’s ratio of non-operating accruals to lagged assets after the tie 
increases the focal firm’s non-operating accruals by 31% of lagged assets, which is 
economically non-trivial. Interestingly, central firm size generally had no impact on 
focal firm conservatism, indicating again that it was not the size of the central firm 
that influenced the focal firm. Columns 7-10 show the analysis for absJM and 
absJM_ROA. The interaction for each variable with D_IntoTie is statistically 
insignificant.  
To summarize, Table 4 Panel A provides evidence that the focal firm conservatism is 
affected central firm conservatism after the two firms are linked. This result is 
consistent across three measures of conservatism. However, focal firms are not 
influenced by central firm discretionary accrual practices. This perhaps highlights the 




literature finds the use of discretionary accruals to be firm-specific, the fact that 
central firm accrual practices bear no impact on the focal firm is consistent with prior 
findings.  
Conservatism, on the other hand, is rooted in demands that are applicable to a wider 
range of firms and therefore is susceptible for transmission through a network. 
Whereas prior literature held that conservatism to be stable over time (Louis et al 
2011, these results demonstrate that a firm’s conservatism style can change in short 
period. My finding that central firms affect focal firm conservatism but not 
discretionary accruals is consistent with prior research that has found that particular 
attributes have a dichotomous affect on the two reporting features (Francis et al, 
2004, LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008 and Warfield et al, 1995). 
Next, in Table 4B, I explore the effect of central firm reporting on focal firms after 
their tie. I compare the years of the tie with an equal number of years after the tie. 
Interestingly, none of the interactions between D_OutTie and central firm accounting 
measures loaded significantly. This suggests that after the central tie is broken, the 
focal firm is no longer influenced by the central firm. In fact, the lack of significance 
indicates that there is no difference in the tie and post-tie period influence of the 
central firm on focal firm reporting. Stated differently, it appears that any focal firm 
retains any influence it gleaned from the central firm after the tie. 
To examine further, I rerun the analysis in Table 5 except I redefine D_IntoTie to 
equal 0 the year before the tie begins and 1 the first year of the tie. This specification 




Table 5A presents the results. In columns 1-3, the interaction between D_IntoTie and 
central firm conservative measures is positive and significant at least at the 10% level. 
The interaction with the discretionary accruals measures was insignificant as in Table 
4. While the results are consistent with that in Table 4, this analysis indicates that 
most of the central firm influence occurs in the first year. This finding also adds to 
interlock research which had only previously measured the effect of networks over a 
longer time horizon. 
Panel A shows that central firm conservatism affects focal firm conservatism in the 
first year of the tie compared to the last year before the tie. But while this finding 
gives importance to the first year of the tie, it is plausible that all subsequent years 
also have equal influence. I address this in Panel B of Table 5 where I compare the 
first year of the tie to the remaining years of the tie. 
I rerun the analysis in Table 4 Panel A but I code a dummy variable, D_FirstYr, 1 if it 
is the first year of the tie and 0 for all other years of the tie. I exclude all ties that only 
last for one year.  In Table 5B, the results of this regression show that the interaction 
terms of interest, between D_FirstYr and central firm conservatism measures, are all 
statistically insignificant. This shows that central firm conservatism in subsequent 
years of the tie is not as influential as it is in year one of the tie. In other words, in the 
first year of the tie, the focal firm reacts to the reporting style of the central firm and 
retains that style so in subsequent years it does need to react to the same information. 
This is analogous to the stock market initially reacting to a firm disclosure, 




Interestingly, columns 4-5 of Table 5B show the interactions between D_FirstYr and 
central firm discretionary accruals are significantly positive, indicating that 
subsequent years of the tie have an incremental influence on focal firm discretionary 
accruals compared to the first year. This provides some evidence that focal firms are 
indeed influenced by central firm discretionary accruals. However, perhaps because 
of the firm specific nature of discretionary accruals, it takes the focal firm longer time 
to adopt such practices.  
Taken together, the results indicate that focal firm reporting of conservatism is 
affected by central firm conservatism and that effect is concentrated in the first year 
of the tie. Also, it appears that there is no difference between the first year of the tie 
and the remaining years of the tie with respect to central firm influence, which 
suggests that after the focal firm is exposed to central firm conservatism, it stays at 
that level. Focal firms appear to be influenced by central firm discretionary accruals 
but only over a longer period of time.  
4.2 Additional Analysis 
 4.2.1 Endogeniety 
 
A key point to address in the empirical design is the potential for endogeniety. It is 
possible that focal firms may self-select to be tied to a central firm if ex-ante they 
know the benefits a central firm could provide. To address endoegeniety concerns, I 
employ the Heckman model. For focal firms, I estimate two decisions: the probability 
of entering in a tie with a central firm (D_intoTie) and the probability of exiting such 
a tie (D_OutofTie). I include all control variables from the main regression model in 




first stage not included in the second stage, I also include the central firm’s average of 
the prior three-years for ROA and Centrality Score.  
Table 6A  presents the probit regressions. Columns 1 shows that the probability of 
entering a tie (D_intoTie) is positively impacted by central firm centrality (β= .164, t-
stat = 5.82) and Geog.Proximity (β= .034, t-stat = 1.65) but negatively affected by the 
focal firm’s Degree (β= .061, t-stat = 3.63), suggesting focal firms that are more 
connected are less likely to interlock with other central firms. Interestingly, the size 
and past performance of the central firm did not impact the probability of entering a 
tie. Overall, this indicates that focal firms interlock with central firms primarily due to 
their centrality and not because of their size or performance. Column 2 shows the 
results for the probability of exiting a central tie. Firm Size, Age and Degree were all 
significantly associated with exiting a tie while BigNAuditor and Tangible Assets 
were negatively related. From the coefficients in Table 6A, I computed Inverse Mills 
Ratio. Table 6B presents the analysis of Table 4 including the Inverse Mills Ratio. 
The inferences remain unchanged.  
Another source of endogeniety could be reverse causation. While the results of Tables 
4 and 5 reveal an association between reporting after the focal and central firms 
become tied, it is conceivable that positive coefficient is due to reverse causation. 
Although prior papers have documented that interlocked firms generally behave 
similarly, reverse causation would be less likely in this case because central firms 
have many sources of information and it is doubtful that any one source has 




showed that a central firm is less likely to be influenced by its interlocks’ prior 
acquisitions when it is deliberating its own acquisition decision.  
Nevertheless, I re-run the analysis of Table 4A but I hold the central firm values 
across the entire tie equal to the first year values. The results in Table 6C are 
generally consistent with Table 4. The interaction terms on C-Score and ConBTM are 
positive and significant. The interaction for ConAcc was statistically insignificant. 
This analysis should alleviate the reverse causation concern because it shows that 
even when the central firm values are held constant, the central firm conservatism is 
still influencing focal firm conservatism after the two firms become tied. 
4.2.2 Convergence of Reporting 
Though evidence indicates that the central firm is influencing focal firm reporting, it 
would still be instructive to know whether the focal firm is proactively changing its 
reporting and converging to the central firm. I examine this process by regressing the 
change of focal firm reporting between year t and t-1 over the prior year difference 
between the focal and central firm, D_intoTie and an interaction between the prior 
year difference and the period dummy. A statistically significant interaction would 
mean that the focal firm is changing its reporting in response to the difference 
between it and the central firm. Table 7A shows that the interaction on all three 
conservatism measures is negative and significant at the 5% level, except for ConAcc. 
Stated differently, after the tie, if the focal firm is more (less) conservative than the 
central firm in the prior year, it will decrease (increase) its conservatism in the current 




In Table 7B, I run a similar analysis as 7A but the dependent variable is the current 
year reporting difference between the focal and central firm. The idea here is to 
examine whether reporting differences between the two firms change over time. 
Again, the interactions for the conservatism models are negative and significant, 
except for C-Score. Combining the observations from panels A and B, the results 
indicate that after the tie, as the prior year conservatism difference between the focal 
and central firm increases, the focal firm reacts by decreasing its change in 
conservatism and thus minimizing the current year difference. This provides more 
evidence that the focal firm is converging to the reporting of the central firm. 
While this interpretation would be in line with the main hypothesis, the original 
reporting differences could affect the type of change the focal firm makes. Thus I 
attempt to determine how pre-tie reporting differences affect the post-tie relationship 
between the two firms. I re-run the main analysis of Table 4A but add, Focal Lower 
Quality, which takes a value of 1 if the focal firm average reporting in the pre-tie 
period is less conservative given the particular measure and 0 otherwise. A similar 
measure is constructed for the discretionary accruals. I interact Focal Lower Quality 
with D_intoTie  to see how firms with initially poorer reporting reacted after the tie.  
The results are presented in Table 7C. The coefficient on Focal Lower Quality was 
negative and significant at the 1% level for all three conservative measures.   The 
interaction between Focal Lower Quality and D_intoTie is positive and significant for 
all three conservative measures (β= 0.103, t-stat = 1.91 β= 0.093, t-stat = 3.71 and β= 
0.105, t-stat = 2.53). Similar results were obtained for the discretionary accruals 




interaction with D_intoTie was negative and significant at the 1%. This suggests that 
a focal firm with initially worse (better) reporting quality than the central firm 
improves its reporting on both dimensions after the tie to the central firm.  
Prior inter-firm studies have documented “contagion,” which is the idea that a 
practice spreads among firms. Usually, it refers to negative situations such as earnings 
management (Chiu et al, 2009) but this evidence indicates that it can also apply to 
accounting. It also points to the possibility of good contagion: the central firms are 
spreading their relatively better reporting to their interlocks.    
4.2.3 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Thus far, the analysis supports the hypothesis that the central firm influences focal 
firm reporting. But further analysis is needed to determine factors that could 
potentially affect this relationship. To do this, I rerun the analysis of Table 4A but I 
include a three way interaction term consisting of D_intoTie, central firm reporting 
measure and the cross sectional variable. I also include the relevant two way 
interactions needed when a three interaction is performed. The coefficient on the 
three way interaction should shed light on any incremental affect these conditions 
have on the relationship between central and focal firm reporting.   
 I broadly examine three categories of cross sectional variables: Director Features, 
Firm Features and Linking Features. The Director Features include whether the 
linking director is on the audit committee of the focal firm, central firm or both firms 
or whether the director is the CEO of the focal or central firm. Prior literature has 
documented the importance of the audit committee and CEO in the formation of 




if the position of the director affects the relationship between the two firms. The Firm 
Features consist of firm Size and Board Independence since at the firm level, these 
two factors have been shown to affect accounting information. The Linking Features 
include whether the two firms share a similar industry, similar auditor and variable 
measuring their Geographical Proximity. These variables are meant to determine if 
the observed affect is greater for firms with other communication channels. It also 
contains a variable, Similar Size, which is coded 1 if the two firms are in the same 
size decile in a given year. This variable aims to capture if the focal firm is more 
influenced by the reporting of a firm that shares its economic fundamentals. The last 
variable in this category is central firm size. This variable tests whether focal firms 
are being influenced by central firm size as opposed to the firm’s centrality. If 
centrality is just a proxy for firm size, then the affect of being tied to larger central 
firms should be greater. 
Table 8 presents the cross sectional results. The position of the linking director at 
either firm did not have an incremental affect on the influence of central firms on 
focal firms1. Next, the size of the focal firm did not affect the tendency of the focal 
firm to be influenced. However, the three way interaction including board 
independence had a negative and significant reaction for the C-Score and ConBTM 
models (β= -.377, t-stat = -2.70 β= -.310, t-stat = -2.98) but it yielded an insignificant 
coefficient for ConAcc. This provides some evidence that focal firms with 
independent boards were less likely to allow the focal firm to be influenced by central 
                                                 
1 I conducted this test by limiting it to observations in which the linking director was on the focal firm 
AC committee, central firm AC committee, on both committees, was the focal firm CEO or central 
firm CEO, respectively. There were too few observations but the general implications are similar to the 




firm reporting. This suggests that independent directors collectively guard the firm 
from external forces. 
 In addition, there was no incremental effect for focal and central firm sharing 
auditors, industries, or having close geographical proximity. Also, the three way 
interaction with Similar Size and central firm size each yielded an insignificant 
coefficient. These two findings together indicate that focal firms are being influenced 
by the central firm not because the central firm is similar in size or because it is large 
in size but the influence is a product of the central firm’s network connectivity.  
4.2.4 Alternate Explanations 
 
To this point, the analysis has shown that the central firm influences focal firm 
conservatism. While the hypothesized mechanism is through board interlocks 
spreading the reporting, it could be that the central firm indirectly influences the focal 
firm. For example, the focal firm could move to have a similar level of board 
independence as the central firm, and since board independence is positively 
associated with conservatism, the increased board independence would affect 
conservatism. In such a scenario, the central firm is affecting focal firm conservatism, 
but only indirectly by influencing focal firm board independence.  
If the central firm was influencing other focal firm practices, I would expect to see 
those practices impacted by central firm practices. To test this possibility, I use a 
similar design to that in Table 4A but I focus on key demands for conservatism. The 
dependent variable is the focal firm attribute regressed on the central firm attribute, 
D_intoTie and the interaction of the two as well as controls. If the interaction is 




central firm attribute after the two firms become tied. I examine Percent Outsiders 
because independent boards affect conservatism. I look at Leverage since creditors 
often demand more conservative reporting. I also inspect Internal Funding since a 
firm’s ability to generate funds will impact its financing need. Tangible Assets and 
Volatility are also included because they proxy for information asymmetry and firm 
uncertainty, two factors which also impact conservatism. It is important to note that I 
remove a particular variable from the set of controls when it is serving as the 
dependent variable.    
Table 9A reports the findings. The β3 coefficient on the interaction between 
D_intoTie and the central firm attribute is insignificant in all cases. This analysis 
suggests that the demands of conservatism of the focal firm are not being influenced 
by the same attributes at the central firm after the tie commences.  
While these attributes are not changing in response to the same central firm attributes, 
it is possible that they behave differently after the tie. For example, the focal firm 
may not change the composition of its board after its tie to the central firm, but the 
board itself may be influenced by the shared director and thus function differently, 
which in turn could lead to more conservatism. Similarly, the focal firm may not 
change its leverage because of central firm leverage but the central firm may 
nonetheless be affecting the focal firm’s leverage levels after the tie through other 
channels. To control for this possibility, I rerun the regressions of Table 4A, but I also 
include additional interactions between D_intoTie and the change in variables that 
capture demand for conservatism. These interactions are meant to control for indirect 




attribute in the regression as a change variable, which in addition to controlling for 
the interaction, also controls for the possibility that natural changes in the focal firm’s 
demand for conservatism affected reporting. 
 Table 9B presents the results. The β3 coefficient on the interaction of D_intoTie and 
central firm conservatism is positive and significant for all three conservatism 
measures. However, none of the interactions between D_ intoTie and the changes in 
demands for conservatism are statistically significant. The results illustrate again that 
not only does focal firm reporting change in response to central firm conservatism but 
also that the central firm does not appear to indirectly influencing focal firm 
conservatism through other mechanisms. Therefore, it is apparent that the mechanism 
the central firm is influencing focal firm reporting is via its own conservative 
reporting. Overall table 9 shows that central firm reporting is influencing focal firm 
reporting and that this influence is robust to other potential indirect mechanisms of 
influence between the two firms and changes in the focal firm environment. 
Another concern with the results is that the relationship picked up in Table 4A may 
merely reflect the flow of information in an interlock and not influence of the central 
firm to the focal firm. If this were the case, the same findings should be found if I 
tracked a firm’s response to the reporting of any of its interlocks. To address this 
concern, I conduct a parallel analysis to that in Table 4A by tracking the interlocks of 
500 firms for which director and financial data are available. I track only one 
interlock per year for each firm. For those firms, I track only one interlock per year. If 
a firm has multiple interlocks per year, I randomly choose one of its interlocking 




central ties above, I keep firms who are only interlocked with to one firm over time 
and where there is sufficient time in the sample before the tie where they were not 
interlocked with any firm. Therefore, the interlock that is assigned to each focal firm 
is a random interlock. Table 10 reproduces the regressions of Table 4A with this new 
sample. The results show that the β3 coefficient on the interaction between D_intoTie 
and the random firm accounting measure is insignificant for all models. This evidence 
supports the notion that the results in Table 5A are due the firm centrality and are not 
merely due to interlocking firms exchanging information. 
4.2.5 Difference in Difference Analysis 
The main tests in this study relied on a within firm analysis, where the pre-tie 
condition of a firm serves as its own control. Subsequent analysis confirmed the 
results. Still in this section, I estimate a difference in difference model. I match each 
focal firm with a non-focal firm based on firm size. A non-focal firm is one that is not 
tied to a central firm. I assign each matched, non-focal firm the central firm of its 
matched focal firm counterpart. I then ran the main model but added a dummy for 
Focal Firm and a three way interaction between D_intoTie, Focal Firm and the 
central firm reporting. The three way interaction would indicate the incremental effect 
the central firm had on the focal firm after the tie relative to the non-focal firms. This 
analysis serves to bolster the idea that the central firm is exerting influence over the 
focal firm.  
The results in Table 11 conform to those in Table 4A. The three way interactions for 
the conservatism variable are all positive significant at conventional levels, except for 




4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to ensure that I properly control for other factors of the central firm that 
could affect focal firm reporting, I rerun Table 4A but additional controls for central 
firm characteristics. In unreported results, the results are consistent with those 
reported in Table 4A. I also control for central firm size by adding an interaction term 
into the analysis between D_intoTie and central firm size. This interaction is 
insignificant more all specifications, suggesting that central firm size is not 
influencing the focal firm, rather it is the conservative reporting of the central firm 














Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
Prior literature has examined the effect of board interlocks on firm behavior. These 
papers have not investigated differences among the type of firm to which a focal firm 
can be tied. Firm centrality is a key dimension to explore because central firms have 
an informational advantage and therefore can spread information and practices much 
quicker through a network because of their position. At the same time, financial 
reporting is meant to be firm specific and might not be prone to being spread in a 
network. 
I find that a focal firm conservatism is influenced by the conservatism of the central 
firm to which it is tied. This finding, while relevant for the entire time such a tie is in 
place, is driven by the first year of the tie. Focal firms adopted central firm 
discretionary accruals but only over a longer horizon. These findings are robust to 
host of cross sectional variables and other potential channels that could link the two 
firms. The results also indicate that the focal firm is converging to the central firm 
reporting and that influence is effected by pre-tie differences between the firms. I also 
provide evidence that board independence was associated with a lower likelihood of 
adopting central firm practices. 
My study draws a distinction between two interlocked firms based on network 
centrality and is consistent with the notion that central firms affect focal firm 
financial reporting. This adds to our understanding of how and why two interlocked 
firms behave similarly while illustrating the speed at which network influences can 










Appendix A  Variable Definitions 
Centrality 
Central Firm 
A firm is a Central Firm in a given year if it ranks in the highest quartile of the Total 
Centrality Score.  
The Total Centrality Score is the summation of the ranked scores of 5 commonly accepted 
centrality measures. 
Total Centrality Score is the sum of the quintile rankings for each of the four centrality 
measures 




The C-Score of a firm as calculated by Kahn Watts 2007 identifies a firm's propensity to 
convey bad news sooner 
ConBTM Book to Market ratio multiplied by negative 1 
ConAcc 
Non Operating accruals scaled by lag assets and are  calculated as total accruals less 
operating accruals. Operating accruals are the non-cash change in current assets less the 
change in current liabilities  
 excluding short term debt.  
absJM Absolute value of discretionary accruals as estimated by the Jones Model. 
absJM_ROA 
Absolute value of discretionary accruals as estimated by the Jones Model after controling for 
return on assets. 
Size Log of market value 
M/B The ratio of market value to book value 
Leverage Te ratio of long term and short term debt to market value 
Volatility The standard deviation of monthly returns of the previous 5 years 
Age the log of the firm's age 
CFO cash flow from operations scaled by lag assets 
Sales Growth The percentage change of sales over prior year 
BigNAuditor Coded 1 if the firm uses a Big N Auditor and 0 otherwise 
BoardIndep Coded 1 if over over 50% of directors are independent 
Percent 
Outside The numbre of independent board members scaled by total board size 
Board Size The number of members a firm has on its board of directors 
Internal 
Funding  Retained Earnings scaled by lag assets 
Tangible 




Coded 1 for all the years a focal firm is tied to a central firm and 0 for an equal number of 
years prior  
D_OutofTie 
Coded 1 for all the years a focal firm is tied to a central firm and 0 for an equal number of 
years prior 
D_IntoTie1yr Coded 1 the first year a focal firm is tied to  central firm and 0 in prior year 
D_first year 
Coded 1 for the first year a focal firm is tied to a central firm and 0 for the other years of the 
tie 
SameIndustry Equals 1 if the focal and central firm from first ties share the same 2 digit SIC code 
SameAuditor Equals 1 if the focal and central firm from first tieshare the same auditor 
GeoProx log of distance in miles between the headquarters of the focal and central firm 







Degree The sum of direct links a firm has to other firms 
Closeness Measures how quickly one firm can reach other firms.  
It is defined as the inverse of the average distance between one firm and another. 
Betweeness Measures how often a firm is the intermediary between two other firms and 
captures the ability of a firm to be an information broker 
Eigenvector 
Eigenvector centrality, sometimes referred to as connectivity, captures the quality of a firm’s 
links. 

















Table 1: Sample Selection 
   
Firm-Years available in RiskMetrics 
for 1996-2006 
             
17,409  
Less: Firms missing financial information 
              
(8,202) 
               
9,207  
Less: Firms not interlocked with 
Central Firm (6,858) 
               
2,349  
Less: Central Firms interlocked with other Central 
Firms (734) 
               
1,615  
Less: Firms interlocked with multiple Central Firms 
per year  (153) 
               
1,462  
  
The In-Tie Sample The Out-Tie Sample 
Less: Firms interlocked with 
multiple central firms during 
the testing window 
              
(469) 
           
(579) 
               
993  
            
883  
Focal Firms in the "In-Tie" 
                  
993  
Focal Firms in the "Out-Tie" 
                  
883  
Less Focal firm years in the "In-Tie"  
                 
(634) 
and "Out-Tie" Sample 
Central Firm interlocked with focal firms 
               
1,363  
Total Number of firms in sample 
               
2,605  




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Univariate Statistics 
  All   Focal  Central      
Variable Sample N Firms Firms Diff t-stat 
Networking Measures 
Degree 0.006 2605 
      
0.003  0.012 -0.009 -66.70*** 
Betweeness 0.252 2605 
      
0.110  0.585 -0.475 -47.40*** 
Eigenvector 2.574 2605 
      
0.856  6.614 -5.758 -41.22*** 
Closeness 0.363 2605 
      
0.359  0.372 -0.013 -4.63*** 
Financial Variables 
Cscore 0.065 2593 0.101 0.011 0.090 11.122*** 
ConAcc 0.057 2060 0.056 0.058 -0.002 -0.446 
ConBTM -0.475 2591 -0.514 -0.414 -0.100 7.770*** 
absJM 0.029 2366 0.025 0.020 0.005 4.498*** 
absJM_ROA 0.024 2366 0.030 0.025 0.005 2.658*** 
Size 8.103 2600 7.403 9.156 -1.753 
-
32.019*** 
M/B 2.957 2591 2.796 3.435 -0.639 -5.192*** 
Leverage 0.648 2593 0.637 0.664 -0.027 -0.697 
Volatility 0.098 2521 0.105 0.088 0.017 9.964*** 
Age 3.187 2529 2.996 3.467 -0.471 
-
15.167*** 
CFO 0.088 2419 0.086 0.093 -0.007 -2.394*** 
Sales Growth 0.109 2605 0.114 0.103 0.011 1.139 
Tangible 0.339 2549 0.347 0.327 0.020 1.736* 
Internal Funding 0.219 2595 0.215 0.225 -0.010 -0.760 
Board Independence 0.842 2605 0.796 0.911 -0.115 -8.118*** 
Linking Variables Mean 
Similar Size 0.082 
Geographical Proximity 5.285 
Same Industry 0.055 
Same Auditor 0.192 
Tie Length_In 1.670 








Panel B: Reporting Changes -FocalFirm 
    After Tie     




Tie Diff T-stat 
Cscore          0.077        0.102  
      
0.123  
       
0.189  
     
0.129  
        
0.151  
           
0.116  
         
0.039  3.054*** 
ConAcc          0.054        0.058  
      
0.067  
       
0.064  
     
0.078  
        
0.038  
           
0.060  
         
0.006  1.020 
ConBTM         (0.504)     (0.490) 
    
(0.567) 
     
(0.563) 
   
(0.559) 
       
(0.609) 
         
(0.519) 
        
(0.015) -0.678 
absJM          0.032        0.036  
      
0.033  
       
0.036  
     
0.018  
        
0.020  
           
0.034  
         
0.002  1.098 
absJM_ROA          0.025        0.027  
      
0.027  
       
0.030  
     
0.011  
        
0.012  
           
0.026  
         
0.001  0.726 
Panel A of this table provides summary statistics. Panel B presents univariate statistics for accounting measures before a focal firm is tied to 
a central firm. Then, it presents the mean of those measures for each year the focal firm is tied to the central firm, the mean of those measures  




Table 3: Correlations 
Panel A: Social Network Measures Correlation   
Deg. Bet. Eigen Close 
Degree 
         
1.000  
Between 
         
0.742  
              
1.000  
Eigenvector 
         
0.739  
              
0.613  
         
1.000  
Close 
         
0.392  
              
0.246  
         
0.176  
         
1.000 
Panel B: Financial 
Variables Correlation 















         
0.688  
              
1.000  
Cscore 
         
0.043  
              
0.059  
         
1.000  
ConBTM 
         
0.030  
              
0.013  
       
(0.250) 
         
1.000  
ConAcc 
        
(0.085) 
            
(0.089) 
       
(0.004) 
        
(0.087) 
         
1.000  
Size 
        
(0.126) 
            
(0.152) 
       
(0.375) 
         
0.412  
        
(0.060) 
         
1.000  
M/B 
         
0.069  
              
0.053  
       
(0.206) 
         
0.487  
        
(0.106) 
         
0.301  
         
1.000  
Leverage 
         
0.001  
              
0.023  
         
0.265  
        
(0.295) 
        
(0.079) 
        
(0.132) 
        
(0.215) 
         
1.000  
Volatility 
         
0.167  
              
0.206  
         
0.143  
         
0.005  
        
(0.061) 
        
(0.296) 
         
0.030  
        
(0.059) 




        
(0.098) 
            
(0.132) 
       
(0.056) 
         
0.023  
        
(0.026) 
         
0.307  
         
0.023  
        
(0.004) 
        
(0.340) 
         
1.000  
Sales Growth 
         
0.060  
              
0.063  
       
(0.082) 
         
0.154  
        
(0.111) 
         
0.117  
         
0.114  
        
(0.057) 
         
0.074  
        
(0.104) 
             
1.000  
CFO 
         
0.047  
              
0.023  
       
(0.163) 
         
0.254  
        
(0.138) 
         
0.173  
         
0.269  
        
(0.283) 
        
(0.093) 
         
0.043  
             
0.013  
         
1.000  
Internal Funding 
        
(0.027) 
            
(0.053) 
       
(0.128) 
        
(0.004) 
         
0.082  
         
0.131  
         
0.088  
        
(0.308) 
        
(0.284) 
         
0.156  
            
(0.048) 
         
0.453  
         
1.000  
Tangible 
        
(0.023) 
            
(0.032) 
       
(0.021) 
        
(0.063) 
         
0.009  
        
(0.029) 
        
(0.065) 
         
0.017  
        
(0.131) 
         
0.095  
             
0.139  
         
0.220  
         
0.044  






        
(0.092) 
            
(0.087) 
       
(0.214) 
         
0.151  
        
(0.010) 
         
0.532  
         
0.102  
         
0.014  
        
(0.195) 
         
0.289  
            
(0.022) 
         
0.049  
         
0.015  
        
(0.034) 1 
Panel A presents pair wise correlations between the social networking variables while Panel B shows the pair wise correlations 
between the financial variables. All Variables are defined in Appendix A. 




Table 4: In and Out Tie Regressions 
Panel A: "In-Tie" Regression 
                  absJM_ absJM_ 
VARIABLES Cscore Cscore ConAcc ConAcc ConBTM ConBTM absJM absJM ROA ROA 
                      
AcctMeasCF  0.0357 0.00307 -0.181*** -0.233*** 0.0545 0.0165 0.00414 0.0430 0.0659 0.101 
(0.315) (0.0271) (-2.918) (-3.241) (1.000) (0.336) (0.0406) (0.469) (0.788) (1.198) 
D_intoTie 0.0403*** 0.00300 0.00964 0.0183 0.0598* 0.0120 0.00110 0.000221 0.00227 0.00253 
(4.185) (0.329) (0.786) (1.089) (1.962) (0.404) (0.243) (0.0397) (0.839) (0.534) 
AcctMeasCF*D_intoTie 0.156 0.149** 0.286*** 0.314*** 0.133** 0.128** 0.116 0.116 0.0188 -0.00166 
(1.622) (2.179) (3.037) (3.049) (2.038) (2.022) (0.953) (1.120) (0.250) (-0.0199) 
Size -0.0307* -0.00243 0.0952*** -0.00328 -0.00347** 
(-1.718) (-0.321) (4.186) (-1.325) (-2.426) 
Size_CF 0.00135 -0.00964 
-
0.0275*** -0.00156 0.00147*** 
(0.145) (-1.589) (-2.735) (-1.013) (5.058) 
M/B 0.00391 -0.00221 0.0205*** -0.000626 0.000279 
(0.449) (-0.677) (2.728) (-0.522) (0.267) 
Leverage 0.0790* 0.0126 -0.0710* -0.00108 -0.00153 
(1.737) (0.653) (-1.956) (-0.309) (-0.444) 
Volatility 0.901*** 0.114 0.0398 0.00921 0.0543 
(3.053) (0.478) (0.0725) (0.168) (1.295) 
SalesGrowth -0.0507 
-
0.0696*** 0.0367 0.00655 -0.000276 
(-1.586) (-2.868) (0.851) (0.654) (-0.0396) 
CFO -0.140 -0.339*** 0.506*** 0.0854* 0.0784** 
(-0.579) (-3.759) (2.870) (1.954) (2.095) 
Age 0.00404 0.000917 0.0432 -0.00452 -0.00289 
(0.333) (0.0767) (1.433) (-1.313) (-0.954) 
Litigation -0.221 0.0498 -0.191 0.0849*** 0.0283** 
(-.740) (0.857) (-1.476) (4.568) (1.990) 




(-0.167) (-0.0836) (0.142) (-0.00356) (-0.273) 
SimilarSize 0.00196 0.0134 -0.0186 -0.00355 0.000852 
(0.244) (1.228) (-0.504) (-1.112) (0.203) 
SameIndustry -0.00773 -0.0171 0.103* 0.00241 0.00132 
(-0.440) (-1.198) (1.917) (0.287) (0.144) 
GeogProximity -0.00242 -0.00659* 0.00575 0.000497 -0.00140 
(-0.410) (-1.711) (0.796) (0.402) (-1.611) 
SameAuditor 0.000339 0.0254* -0.0726* 0.00203 0.00150 
(0.0166) (1.673) (-1.803) (0.342) (0.341) 
BoardIndep -0.00141 -0.00549 -0.0256 -0.0109** -0.000505 
(-0.0906) (-0.448) (-0.682) (-2.401) (-0.147) 
TieLength_IN 0.0191*** -0.00625 0.0176 0.00124 6.15e-05 
(3.515) (-0.987) (1.296) (0.726) (0.0396) 
BoardSize -0.00375 0.00124 -0.0126** 0.000870 0.00127** 
(-1.424) (0.359) (-2.079) (0.523) (2.022) 
Internal Funding 0.0124 0.0566 -0.187*** -0.0116 -0.00321 
(0.248) (1.440) (-2.648) (-0.902) (-0.670) 
TangibleAssets -0.0171 0.0313 -0.149* 0.0193 0.00246 
(-0.295) (0.402) (-1.794) (1.626) (0.249) 
Degree 0.000689 0.00233 -0.00101 0.000298 0.000500 
(0.303) (0.881) (-0.261) (0.464) (0.806) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Returns Included Yes Yes 




0.163*** -0.484** 0.00243 0.0130 
-
0.00234 -0.0186 
(4.810) (0.812) (-7.575) (0.414) (-2.956) (-1.982) (0.936) (0.408) (-1.036) (-0.923) 
Observations 960 850 571 541 919 817 748 709 748 709 







Panel B: Out Tie Regressions 
                  absJM_ absJM_ 
VARIABLES Cscore Cscore ConAcc ConAcc ConBTM ConBTM absJM absJM ROA ROA 
                      
AccMeasCF 0.182*** 0.152*** 0.133* 0.0694 0.162** 0.0836 0.134*** 0.137*** -0.0232 -0.0116 
(3.581) (2.676) (1.961) (0.726) (2.177) (1.403) (3.336) (3.038) (-0.220) (-0.109) 
D_OutTie -0.0100 -0.00190 -0.0132 -0.00468 -0.0358 -0.000712 0.00473 0.00520 
-
0.00190 -0.000670 
(-0.578) (-0.122) (-1.230) (-0.370) (-0.631) (-0.0238) (0.905) (1.076) (-0.519) (-0.151) 
AccMeasCF*D_OutTie -0.0522 0.00602 -0.101 0.0208 -0.126 -0.0416 -0.117 -0.0547 0.121 0.129 
(-0.817) (0.0861) (-0.809) (0.198) (-1.113) (-0.650) (-1.277) (-0.605) (1.480) (1.326) 
Size 
-
0.0404*** 0.00884 0.0681*** 
-
0.00580** -0.00276 
(-2.728) (0.967) (4.142) (-2.109) (-1.260) 
Size_CF 0.00389 
-
0.0108*** -0.0299** -0.00174 -0.000997 
(0.666) (-2.627) (-2.268) (-1.508) (-0.590) 
M/B 0.000907 
-
0.00773** 0.0250*** 0.000233 4.13e-05 
(0.148) (-2.217) (4.116) (0.143) (0.0451) 
Leverage 0.0737 0.00865 
-
0.0838*** 0.00130 0.00152 
(1.288) (0.776) (-3.434) (0.465) (0.655) 
Volatility -0.211 0.0647 -0.844* -0.00667 0.0260 
(-0.808) (0.387) (-1.883) (-0.135) (0.664) 
SalesGrowth -0.0421* -0.0601* 0.0236 0.00194 -0.00375 
(-1.937) (-1.859) (0.606) (0.205) (-0.383) 
CFO -0.0262 -0.132 0.609*** 0.0152 0.0779* 
(-0.193) (-1.086) (3.128) (0.349) (1.882) 
Age -0.00770 -0.00302 0.0820* -0.00326 -0.00268 
(-0.673) (-0.232) (1.965) (-1.270) (-0.992) 
Litigation -0.0569 -0.137*** -0.487** 0.0189 0.0112 
(-0.277) (-3.291) (-2.319) (1.179) (0.703) 




(1.654) (3.145) (0.553) (0.274) (0.676) 
SimilarSize 0.0158 -0.00529 0.00760 -0.000825 0.00393 
(1.168) (-0.372) (0.250) (-0.132) (0.751) 
SameIndustry 0.0761*** -0.0140 0.0172 -0.0112 0.00362 
(5.317) (-0.778) (0.283) (-1.100) (0.482) 
GeoProximity -0.00151 -0.00309 -0.000850 -0.00148 -0.00121* 
(-0.777) (-0.647) (-0.117) (-1.203) (-1.694) 
SameAuditpr 0.00506 0.000736 
-
0.0993*** -0.00477 -0.00104 
(0.159) (0.0726) (-2.725) (-1.239) (-0.367) 
BoardIndep 0.0179 0.0171 -0.0293 0.00239 0.00635 
(0.682) (0.796) (-1.184) (0.381) (1.199) 
TieLength_Out 0.0104* -0.00572* -0.00934 -5.33e-05 
-
0.00243** 
(1.889) (-1.799) (-0.934) (-0.0992) (-2.168) 
BoardSize -0.00314 0.000742 
-
0.0226*** 0.00111 0.00111 
(-0.831) (0.207) (-4.093) (1.161) (1.507) 
Funding -0.0283 0.0528* -0.367*** -0.0121 0.00757 
(-0.609) (1.759) (-3.856) (-1.453) (0.950) 
TangibleAssets -0.0498 -0.143** -0.137* 0.00587 -0.00635 
(-1.218) (-2.262) (-1.782) (0.469) (-0.450) 
Degree -0.00403 -0.00114 -0.00149 0.000510 0.000417 
(-1.476) (-0.701) (-0.404) (0.717) (0.450) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Returns Included Yes Yes 
Constant 0.156 0.394** 0.0301*** 0.0861 -0.138 -0.443* 0.0134 0.0718*** 0.00779 0.0234 
(0.936) (2.334) (4.857) (0.481) (-0.873) (-1.657) (1.609) (4.199) (0.928) (0.787) 
Observations 799 704 459 426 796 664 611 573 611 573 







Panel A presents the "in tie" analysis. The focal firm accouting measure is regressed on central firm accounting measure, a dummy variable 
(D_intoTie) set to 1 during the tie and 0 for an equal number the tie and an interaction between central firm accounting and the dummy variable. 
Panel B presents the "out tie" analysis. All variables are the same except the dummy (D_OutofTie) is 1 the years of  the tie and 0 for years before 
and equal number of years afte the tie. All control variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Industry 
fixed effects are included. 













Table 5: First Year Analysis 
Panel A: Impact of First Year 
            
VARIABLES Cscore ConAcc ConBTM absJM absJM_ROA 
            
AcctMeasCF  0.0461 -0.194** 0.0266 0.117 0.117 
(0.412) (-2.374) (0.642) (1.387) (1.637) 
D_intoTie 0.0141 0.0133 0.0269 0.00384 0.00364 
(0.967) (0.809) (1.181) (0.591) (0.785) 
AcctMeasCF*D_intoTie 0.194* 0.296** 0.0881* 0.0135 -0.102 
(1.759) (2.097) (1.741) (0.0784) (-1.189) 
Size -0.0215 -0.000763 0.0811*** -0.00542** -0.00470*** 
(-1.165) (-0.0613) (3.488) (-2.323) (-3.562) 
Size_CF 0.00960 -0.0112* -0.0266*** -0.00114 0.00125 
(0.917) (-1.652) (-2.969) (-0.437) (0.951) 
M/B -0.00296 -0.00252 0.0194*** -0.000208 0.000573 
(-0.428) (-0.541) (2.973) (-0.181) (0.538) 
Leverage 0.0731** 0.0193 -0.0965** 0.000267 0.000201 
(2.001) (0.633) (-2.556) (0.0667) (0.0600) 
Volatility 1.295*** 0.289 0.478 -0.00627 0.0475 
(4.240) (0.810) (0.549) (-0.0709) (0.908) 
SalesGrowth -0.0529 -0.0766** 0.0635* 0.00513 0.00290 
(-0.990) (-2.075) (1.729) (0.403) (0.314) 
CFO -0.420* -0.336*** 0.769*** 0.0913** 0.0872*** 
(-1.781) (-2.663) (2.850) (2.502) (2.738) 
Age -0.00902 -0.00432 0.0420 -0.00370 -0.00139 
(-0.559) (-0.359) (1.203) (-0.848) (-0.424) 
Litigation 0.114 0.141 -0.249** 0.0876*** 0.0353* 
(1.300) (-1.069) (-2.105) (3.413) (1.790) 
BigNauditor 0.00800 -0.174** 0.0663 -0.000585 0.00269 
(0.0761) (-2.404) (0.652) (-0.0691) (0.441) 
SimilarSize 0.00282 0.00745 -0.00711 -0.00493 -0.000906 
(0.0919) (0.363) (-0.194) (-0.559) (-0.141) 
SameIndustry 0.0420** -0.000479 0.0656 -0.00870 -0.00242 
(2.084) (-0.0173) (1.361) (-0.684) (-0.203) 
GeogProximity -0.00272 -0.00373 0.00170 0.00171 -0.000379 
(-0.302) (-0.625) (0.184) (0.952) (-0.323) 
SameAuditor 0.0123 0.0195 -0.0555* 0.00504 0.00139 
(0.448) (1.054) (-1.813) (0.740) (0.309) 
BoardIndep -0.00773 -0.0159 -0.00230 -0.0177*** -0.00481 
















BoardSize -0.00233 0.00266 -0.00762 0.00101 0.00208*** 
(-0.665) (0.690) (-0.948) (0.570) (6.120) 
Funding 0.0795* 0.0449 -0.157** -0.0157** -0.00769 
(1.945) (0.779) (-2.364) (-2.316) (-1.218) 
TangibleAssets -0.00491 0.0970 -0.153* 0.0241 0.00533 
(-0.0723) (1.026) (-1.898) (1.471) (0.398) 
Degree 0.00153 0.00272 -0.000968 -0.000247 4.99e-05 
(0.479) (0.955) (-0.215) (-0.310) (0.0700) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Returns Included Yes 
Constant 0.119 0.135 -0.603* 0.0139 -0.0353 
(0.672) (0.670) (-1.726) (0.269) (-0.910) 
Observations 570 368 547 481 481 
R-squared 0.528 0.387 0.789 0.483 0.493 
 
Panel B: Impact of Other 
Years of Tie  
 
VARIABLES Cscore ConAcc ConBTM absJM absJM_ROA 
        
AcctMeasCF  -0.0209 -0.345** -0.0192 -0.185 -0.159 
(-0.0936) (-2.098) (-0.215) (-0.630) (-0.589) 
D_intoTie First YR 0.0456* -0.00598 0.0305 -0.00858 -0.0115* 
(1.654) (-0.388) (0.635) (-0.937) (-1.796) 
AcctMeasCF*D_intoTie 0.0857 0.328* 0.0924 0.460* 0.456* 
(0.391) (1.675) (0.850) (1.871) (1.657) 
Size -0.0193 -0.0206 0.122** -0.00281 -0.00695 
(-0.774) (-0.839) (2.536) (-0.181) (-0.524) 
Size_CF -0.0196 0.000319 -0.0326 -0.00106 0.00297 
(-0.918) (0.0485) (-1.486) (-0.284) (0.833) 
M/B 0.0210 -0.00672 0.0454** 3.52e-05 0.00275 
(1.523) (-0.915) (2.417) (0.00992) (1.075) 
Leverage 0.0337 -0.0616*** 0.00731 0.00834 -0.000681 
(0.544) (-3.113) (0.182) (1.170) (-0.126) 
Volatility 0.329 0.326* -0.333 0.149 0.0994 
(0.367) (1.719) (-0.339) (0.887) (0.568) 
SalesGrowth -0.0533 -0.107** -0.0878 0.00595 -0.00719 
(-1.008) (-2.482) (-1.048) (0.464) (-0.512) 
CFO 0.468 -0.0257 0.0154 0.134 0.120 
(1.120) (-0.177) (0.105) (1.129) (1.069) 
Age 0.0315 0.0147 0.101 -0.00738 -0.00804 
(0.577) (0.504) (1.360) (-0.435) (-0.460) 
Litigation 0.196 0.134* 0.689** 0.0227 0.0330 
















(-0.381) (6.927) (-0.128) (1.371) (-0.190) 
SimilarSize 0.122 -0.0262 -0.0448 0.00386 0.00540 
(1.344) (-0.731) (-0.773) (0.303) (0.329) 
SameIndustry -0.00242 0.0798 0.167 0.0456* 0.0333 
(1.009) (1.005) (1.416) (1.752) (1.415) 
GeogProximity 0.00629 0.0117 -0.00293 -0.00434 -0.00450** 
(1.573) (1.531) (-0.174) (-1.621) (-2.168) 
SameAuditor -0.0635 -0.0858 -0.155 -0.0122 -0.0171 
(-1.193) (-1.146) (-1.432) (-0.280) (-0.448) 
BoardIndep -0.0625** 0.0322 -0.0560 0.00847 0.00827 
(-2.069) (0.930) (-0.905) (0.642) (0.794) 
BoardSize -0.00160 0.0104 -0.0349*** -0.00398 -0.000736 
(-0.136) (1.551) (-3.007) (-1.468) (-0.370) 
Internal Funding -0.175 0.0524 -0.153 -0.00845 0.00433 
(-1.448) (0.728) (-1.439) (-0.247) (0.140) 
TangibleAssets -0.0294 -0.217*** -0.215 0.0445 0.0120 
(-0.214) (-3.933) (-1.426) (0.761) (0.224) 
Degree -0.0116 -0.00862 0.0208* 0.00583* 0.00498* 
(-1.112) (-1.207) (1.797) (1.859) (1.771) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Returns Included Yes 
Constant 0.267** -0.302** -0.628 -0.00280 -0.00589 
(2.005) (-2.212) (-1.499) (-0.0366) (-0.0711) 
Observations 268 162 264 223 223 
R-squared 0.454 0.694 0.858 0.468 0.527 
In Panel A, the focal firm accouting measure is regressed on central firm accounting measure, a dummy  
variable and an interaction of the two. The dummy variable is set to 1 the first year of the tie and 0  the  
year before the tie. 
In Panel B, the model is similar except that the dummy is 1 the first year of the tie and 0 the remaining  
years of the tie. 
All control variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. 












Table 6: Endogeniety Analysis   
Panel A: First Stage Heckman Analysis 
VARIABLES D_intoTie D_OutofTie 
      
SimilarSize 0.00114 0.00202 
(0.00585) (0.0150) 
SameIndustry 0.0278 -0.0778 
(0.194) (-0.631) 
GeogProximity 0.0345* 0.0140 
(1.647) (0.743) 
CentralityScoreAvg_CF 0.164*** 0.0155 
(5.821) (0.500) 
ROAAvg_CF -1.017 -0.129 
(-1.115) (-0.163) 
Size 0.0107 0.101** 
(0.311) (2.480) 
Size_CF -0.0286 0.0191 
(-0.806) (0.607) 
M/B -0.0149 -0.0323 
(-1.075) (-1.611) 
Leverage -0.000509 0.0888 
(-0.00613) (1.436) 
Volatility -1.387 1.617 
(-1.209) (1.390) 
SalesGrowth 0.00118 0.379 
(0.00550) (1.595) 
CFO -0.773 0.993 
(-1.029) (1.282) 
Age 0.0752 0.183*** 
(1.273) (3.247) 
Litigation 0.0103 -0.0649 
(0.0956) (-0.513) 
BigNauditor 0.385* -0.747* 
(1.713) (-1.912) 
SameAuditor -0.0728 -0.0785 
(-0.863) (-0.852) 
BoardIndep 0.150 0.144 
(1.226) (0.990) 
BoardSize 0.00271 -0.0398 
(0.110) (-1.471) 
Internal Funding -0.182 -0.238 
(-1.246) (-1.547) 




TangibleAssets -0.157 -0.556*** 
(-0.977) (-2.927) 
Degree -0.0616*** 0.0347** 
(-3.632) (2.228) 
Constant -2.535*** -1.109 
(-3.900) (-1.524) 
Observations 676 604 
 
Panel B: "In-Tie" Regression controlling for Inverse Mills Ratio 
          absJM_ 
VARIABLES Cscore ConAcc ConBTM absJM ROA 
            
AcctMeasCF  -0.0284 -0.206 -0.0634 0.0227 0.216*** 
(-0.242) (-1.589) (-1.029) (0.196) (4.151) 
D_intoTie -0.00496 0.0181 0.0361 -0.00274 0.00365 
(-0.386) (0.815) (1.100) (-0.377) (0.629) 
AcctMeasCF*D_intoTie 0.159*** 0.312** 0.173** 0.222** -0.0552 
(2.919) (2.037) (2.362) (2.167) (-0.636) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.0141 -0.0385 -0.0910 -0.0102 -0.00786 
(0.262) (-1.378) (-1.055) (-1.038) (-0.794) 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Returns Included Yes 
Constant 0.274 -0.0553 -0.333 0.0649* -0.00531 
(0.932) (-0.357) (-1.351) (1.664) (-0.280) 
Observations 673 428 653 569 569 


















Panel C: Holding First Year of Central Firm Constant 
          absJM_ 
VARIABLES Cscore ConAcc ConBTM absJM ROA 
            
AcctMeasCF  0.0298 0.226*** -0.0249 0.0207 -0.0470 
(0.516) (2.661) (-0.356) (0.245) (-0.462) 
D_intoTie 0.00136 -0.00476 -0.0129 -0.00157 -0.000254 
(0.133) (-0.314) (-0.600) (-0.234) (-0.0441) 
AcctMeasCF*D_intoTie 0.211*** -0.0705 0.0654** 0.158 0.0983 
(2.632) (-0.600) (2.001) (1.084) (1.019) 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Returns Yes 
Constant 0.204 0.0480 -0.476* 0.0122 -0.0135 
(0.976) (0.270) (-1.901) (0.344) (-0.627) 
Observations 848 542 818 704 704 
R-squared 0.421 0.340 0.745 0.406 0.409 
 
Panel A presents the Heckman first stage  model. The first column presents the probability of entering 
a tie with a central firm while the second column estimates the probability of exiting such a tie. 
ROAAvg_CF is the average ROA for the central firm for years t-2, t-1 and t. CentralityScoreAvg_CF 
is the average Centrality Score for years t-2, t-1 and t. Z-statistics are presentd in parenthesis.  
Panel B reruns analysis of Table 5A but includes the Inverse Mills Ratio for each model. 
Panel C reruns analysis of Table 5A but holds the values of the central firm constant to that of the 
first year of the tie. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix A. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 














Table 7: Convergence 
Analysis 
Panel A: Reporting Response to 
Differences 
  Cscore  ConAcc ConBTM absJM 
absJM_ 
ROA 
VARIABLES Change Change Change Change Change 
            
D_intoTie 0.0119 -0.00164 -0.0421* 0.0190*** 0.0230*** 
(0.622) (-0.103) (-1.937) (3.823) (5.470) 
PY_Reporting_Diff -0.409*** -0.449*** -0.0584* -0.640*** -0.622*** 
(-4.393) (-3.560) (-1.716) (-4.997) (-4.890) 
PY_RptDiff*D_intoTie -0.247** -0.226 -0.111** 0.0286 0.114 
(-2.340) (-1.194) (-1.979) (0.124) (0.715) 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Returns Included Yes 
Constant -0.0411 -0.194 1.459*** -0.0219 -0.0705** 
(-0.105) (-1.124) (5.735) (-0.611) (-2.015) 
Observations 812 538 819 691 691 













            
D_intoTie 0.0217 0.0223 -0.0321 0.000758 0.00289 
(0.697) (1.545) (-1.205) (0.125) (0.746) 
PY_Reporting_ 
Diff 0.213 0.0219 0.698*** 0.0535* 0.0315 
(1.229) (0.187) (11.21) (1.828) (1.584) 
PY_RptDiff* 
D_intoTie -0.350 -0.241*** -0.134** -0.199 -0.0494 
(-1.455) (-2.959) (-2.075) (-1.332) (-0.525) 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.407*** 0.0825 0.106 -0.0222 -0.0188 
(4.279) (1.251) (1.238) (-0.778) (-1.091) 
Observations 907 567 953 726 726 




Panel C: Pre-Tie Difference Analysis 
VARIABLES Cscore ConAcc ConBTM absJM absJM_ROA 
            
AcctMeasCF  -0.0222*** -0.0558** -0.115** 0.0167*** 0.0168*** 
(-2.755) (-2.583) (-2.414) (2.989) (3.081) 
D_intoTie 0.0807 -0.00829 0.163*** 0.185** 0.251*** 
(0.650) (-0.0794) (2.827) (2.323) (3.453) 
AcctMeasCF*D_intoTie 0.0591 0.106 0.00292 -0.0300 -0.137 
(0.712) (0.781) (0.0364) (-0.321) (-1.620) 
FocalLowerRpt -0.0704*** -0.0926*** -0.186*** 0.0248*** 0.0255*** 
(-4.380) (-4.295) (-4.521) (4.097) (5.457) 
FocalLowerRpt*D_intoTie 0.102* 0.0929*** 0.105** -0.0238*** -0.0193*** 
(1.919) (3.717) (2.526) (-3.535) (-3.393) 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Returns Yes 
Constant 0.214 0.0893 -0.242 0.0227 -0.00663 
(0.946) (0.741) (-0.831) (0.810) (-0.310) 
Observations 850 541 817 709 709 
R-squared 0.424 0.399 0.768 0.427 0.449 
Panel A regresses the change of focal firm reporting for each reporting variable on D_intoTie, which 
is coded 1 for years of the tie and 0 an equal number of years before the tie, PY_Rpt_Diff, which is 
the prior year reporting difference between the focal and central firm and an interaction between the 
two variables. 
Panel B regresses the current year reporting difference of the focal and central firm on the prior year 
difference between the two firms, D_intoTie and an interaction between those two variables. 
Panel C regresses current year focal firm accounting measures on D_intoTie, Focal Lower and in 
interaction between these two variables. Focal Lower is coded 1 if the focal firm had lower 
conservatism (higher discretionary accruals )than the central firm in the pre-tie period  and 0 
otherwise. Central firm reporting values are also included in the regression as well as an interaction 
between central firm reporting values and D_intoTie. 
All control variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. 
Industry fixed effects are included. 




Table 8: Cross Sectional Analysis 
          
VARIABLES   Cscore ConAcc ConBTM 
Director Features 
AC-Focal Firm 0.231 0.0931 0.182 
(0.874) (0.380) (1.647) 
N 664 422 644 
R-Squared   0.433 0.380 0.805 
CEO-Focal Firm -0.114 -0.357 -0.00887 
(-0.490) (-1.256) (-0.064) 
N 666 422 646 
R-Squared   0.431 0.382 0.799 
AC-Central Firm -0.263 -0.152 -0.154 
(-1.177) (-0.384) (-1.251) 
N 667 426 648 
R-Squared   0.436 0.370 0.808 
CEO-Central Firm 0.137 -0.0714 0.000326 
(0.785) (-0.374) 0.003 
N 667 426 648 
R-Squared   0.431 0.370 0.803 
AC-Both 0.0624 0.173 -0.0607 
(0.453) (0.657) (-0.368) 
N 673 428 653 
R-Squared   0.430 0.372 0.801 
Firm Features 
Firm Size -0.0737 -0.105 -0.0363 
(-1.031) (-1.010) (-0.633) 
N 673 428 653 
R-Squared   0.445 0.374 0.814 
Board Independence -0.377*** 0.0527 -0.319*** 
(-2.703) (0.203) (-2.975) 
N 673 428 653 
R-Squared   0.432 0.369 0.805 
Linking Features 
Central Firm Size -0.048 0.0982 0.0244 
(-1.580) (0.771) (0.608) 
N 673 428 653 
R-Squared   0.296 0.379 0.799 
Similar Size 0.448 -0.0854 0.0677 
(1.428) (-0.210) (0.288) 
N 673 428 653 
R-Squared   0.433 0.371 0.765 
Same Industry 0.312 1.064** -0.262 
(0.530) (2.128) (-1.078) 
N 673 428 653 




Same Auditor (1.643) -1.873 -0.124 
-0.006 -0.520 (-0.880) 
N 673 428.000 653.000 
R-Squared   0.436 0.371 0.799 
Geographical Proximity 0.0484 -0.0413 -0.0101 
(1.317) (-0.377) (-0.227) 
N 673 428 653 
R-Squared   0.442 0.374 0.763 
This table reruns the analsis of Table 5 but adds to it a three way interaction between D_intoTie, 
Central Firm accounting measure and a cross sectional variable. Each regression also includes the 
requisite interactions needed when performing a three-way interaction. Each row of the table presents 
the three way interaction of the regression. In Column 1, the dependent variable is Cscore, in column 
2  it is ConAcc and in column 3 it is ConBTM. The main effects, control variables and fixed 
effects are calculated but omitted for brevity. 
All control variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and  year. 
Industry fixed effects are included. 




Table 9: Alternate Channels of 
Influence 
Panel A: Indirect Effect 
      Internal     
VARIABLES % Outsiders Leverage Funding 
TangibleAsset
s Volatility 
            
Central Firm Attribute 0.0664 0.0152 0.152** 0.0547 0.386*** 
(1.617) (0.426) (2.372) (0.871) (3.428) 
D_intoTie 0.0260 0.145** 0.000536 -0.0252** -0.00289 
(0.675) (2.056) (0.0196) (-2.286) (-0.398) 
D_intoTie*CF Attribute -0.0102 -0.0101 -0.0514 0.0176 -0.0125 
(-0.220) (-0.411) (-1.041) (0.409) (-0.191) 
Size   0.0110* 0.0280 0.0679* -0.0291** -0.00426* 
(1.722) (0.590) (1.805) (-1.978) (-1.772) 
Size_CF 0.00585 -0.0455* -0.00469 0.00875 0.00470** 
(1.129) (-1.688) (-0.336) (1.132) (2.322) 
M/B -0.00236 -0.00127 -0.00874 -0.00640 0.00187* 
(-0.907) (-0.0445) (-1.088) (-1.510) (1.752) 
SalesGrowth -0.00843 -0.238** -0.0139 0.0922** 0.0105* 
(-0.636) (-2.453) (-0.322) (2.455) (1.842) 
CFO -0.0265 -0.739 1.208*** 0.0838 0.0141 
(-0.398) (-1.226) (7.127) (0.823) (0.673) 
Age 0.00800 0.0397 0.0231 0.0253 -0.00859** 
(0.713) (1.128) (0.831) (1.311) (-2.084) 
Litigation 0.118** -1.418*** 0.141 -0.499*** 0.0373*** 
(2.169) (-6.678) (1.627) (-6.887) (3.204) 
BigNauditor 0.00738 -0.0911 -0.0412 0.0195 -0.00856 
(0.609) (0.512) (-0.516) (0.774) (-1.384) 
SimilarSize -0.00184 -0.192** -0.0454 0.00820 -0.00298 
(-0.122) (-2.562) (-1.015) (0.481) (-0.554) 
SameIndustry 0.00499 0.212 0.0861 -0.0508 -0.00412 
(0.187) (1.604) (0.925) (-1.004) (-0.515) 
GeogProximity 0.00697 0.0610** 0.0193** -0.00230 -0.000535 
(1.484) (2.373) (2.138) (-0.262) (-0.483) 
SameAuditor 0.0198 0.0185 0.00630 -0.00174 0.00288 
(0.974) (0.189) (0.130) (-0.0725) (0.457) 
BoardIndep 0.287*** 0.0538 0.00258 -0.0189 0.00254 
(15.38) (0.809) (0.0556) (-0.739) (0.494) 
TieLength_IN -0.00414 -0.0779** 0.0147 0.00631 0.00191 
(-0.660) (-2.190) (1.523) (1.067) (1.541) 
BoardSize -0.00692** 7.73e-05 -0.0149 0.00830 -0.00141 
(-2.333) (0.00398) (-1.644) (1.555) (-1.032) 




(1.458) (0.0533) (-3.011) (1.996) (-0.385) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.000919 -0.115 0.183** 0.0121 -0.00418 
(-0.0399) (-0.701) (2.266) (0.243) (-0.382) 
Leverage 0.000849 -0.101*** -0.0467 -0.000155 
(0.0787) (-3.807) (-1.516) (-0.0213) 
Internal Funding -0.00905 -0.244 0.0712*** -0.0483*** 
(-0.325) (-1.584) (2.861) (-4.874) 
TangibleAssets 0.000308 -0.604* 0.204*** 0.00412 
(0.00656) (-1.912) (2.770) (0.281) 
Volatility 0.202 -0.233 -3.291*** -0.00921 
(1.600) (-0.200) (-5.156) (-0.0282) 
Constant 0.221 1.835*** -0.100 0.778*** 0.119*** 
(1.622) (3.661) (-0.363) (4.245) (3.545) 
Observations 676 673 671 665 667 
R-squared 0.811 0.736 0.780 0.880 0.821 
Panel B: Controlling For Indirect 
Effect 
          absJM 
VARIABLES Cscore ConAcc ConBTM absJM ROA 
            
AcctMeasCF  0.0205 -0.171 0.0295 0.0628 0.138 
(0.149) (-1.563) (0.494) (0.938) (1.279) 
D_intoTie  -0.00375 0.0165 0.0332 0.00179 0.00510 
(-0.224) (0.915) (1.300) (0.325) (0.963) 
AcctMeasCF*D_intoTie 0.146** 0.195* 0.156** 0.0961 -0.0346 
(2.091) (1.656) (2.204) (1.235) (-0.312) 
InfoAsym*D_intoTie 0.0439 -0.0444 0.104 0.0140 0.00727 
(0.279) (-0.318) (0.642) (0.522) (0.364) 
FinNeeds*D_intoTie -0.345 0.122 0.107 0.0139 0.00814 
(-1.421) (0.548) (0.667) (0.271) (0.282) 
Leverage*D_intoTie 0.0196 0.0309 0.0766 0.00248 -0.00711 
(0.319) (0.798) (1.427) (0.417) (-1.291) 
Uncertainty*D_intoTie -1.511 0.176 0.320 0.127 0.399 
(-1.187) (0.225) (0.432) (0.338) (1.567) 
Outisiders*D_intoTie 0.178 -0.0253 -0.394** -0.0115 -0.0527 
(0.783) (-0.234) (-2.084) (-0.279) (-1.359) 
Size -0.0401** -0.00331 0.0812*** -0.00200 -0.00321* 
(-1.978) (-0.405) (4.012) (-0.588) (-1.900) 
Size_CF 0.000445 -0.00500 -0.0351*** -0.00148 0.00112 




M/B 0.00495 -2.75e-05 0.0220*** -0.000534 0.000474 
(0.545) (-0.0107) (2.812) (-0.406) (0.358) 
Leverage Change 0.0888** -0.00693 -0.0601* -0.00441 -0.00155 
(2.131) (-0.314) (-1.754) (-1.544) (-0.453) 
Volatility Change 0.767 0.167 1.240 0.0781 -0.281 
(1.080) (0.316) (1.381) (0.233) (-1.473) 
SalesGrowth -0.0336 -0.0853** -9.69e-05 0.00528 0.00163 
(-0.957) (-2.441) (-0.00228) (0.746) (0.198) 
CFO -0.216 -0.396*** 0.224 0.0721** 0.0730** 
(-0.841) (-2.805) (1.183) (2.557) (2.037) 
Age 0.00448 0.00766 0.0380 -0.00770** -0.00506 
(0.253) (0.665) (1.134) (-2.195) (-1.534) 
Litigation 0.114 0.00547 -0.677*** 0.0709*** 0.0320** 
(0.999) (0.143) (-8.648) (7.482) (2.272) 
BigNauditor -0.0295 0.0844 0.0393 -0.00151 -0.00251 
(-0.236) (1.444) (0.434) (-0.161) (-0.263) 
SimilarSize -7.94e-05 0.0115 -0.00210 -0.00415 0.00186 
(-0.00505) (0.818) (-0.0608) (-1.436) (0.427) 
SameIndustry -0.00275 -0.0197 0.0790 -0.00164 0.00221 
(-0.0933) (-1.334) (1.348) (-0.205) (0.202) 
GeogProximity -0.00425 
-
0.00845*** 0.00486 0.000184 -0.00127 
(-0.596) (-2.686) (0.809) (0.137) (-1.312) 
SameAuditor -0.00162 0.0230* -0.0526 0.00723 0.00257 
(-0.0714) (1.652) (-1.158) (1.004) (0.494) 
% Outsider Change -0.152* -0.0474 0.205 -0.0147 0.0322 
(-1.693) (-0.627) (1.633) (-0.643) (1.001) 
TieLength_IN 0.0231*** -0.00428 0.0169 0.000270 -0.000418 
(3.231) (-0.641) (1.386) (0.177) (-0.244) 
BoardSize -0.00529 0.00422 -0.0141*** 0.000917 0.000960 
(-1.224) (1.112) (-2.608) (0.511) (1.534) 
Internal Funding Change 0.238 0.159 -0.310*** -0.0332 -0.0139 
(1.486) (0.967) (-2.739) (-1.101) (-0.665) 
TangibleAssets change -0.156 0.00350 -0.0385 0.0302 0.0142 
(-1.319) (0.0285) (-0.303) (1.320) (1.061) 
Degree 0.00111 0.00256 -8.81e-05 0.000136 0.000724 
(0.392) (1.231) (-0.0202) (0.175) (0.966) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Returns Included Yes 
Constant 0.399 -0.0646 -0.412* 0.0297 -0.00543 




Observations 748 477 729 623 623 
R-squared 0.431 0.384 0.762 0.418 0.422 
Panel A examines whether other focal firm practices were influenced by the central firm. Each 
column represents a different dependent variable: Percent Outsider, Leverage, Internal Funding, 
Tangible Assets and Volatility. The dependent variable is regressed on the central firm measure of the 
same practice, a dummy variable set to 1 in the years the focal and central firm are tied and 0 an equal 
number of years before the tie, and an interaction between the two. Control variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
Panel B augments the analysis in Table 5A by including several interactions between D_intoTie and    
changes to demands for conservatism.  Information Asymmetry is captured by change in Tangible 
Assets (PPE/Lag Assets) , Finance Needs is captured by change Retained Earnings scaled by Lag 
Assets, Leverage is measured as the change in short and long term debt scaled by size,  Uncertainty is 
captured by the change in volatility is measured as the standard deviation of monthly returns over the 
past 5  years while Outsiders is the change in the percentage independent directors on the board. All 
control variables are measured at time t, except for Volatility, Leverage, Internal Funding, Tangible 
Assets and Percent Outsiders, which are measured as the change from t-1 to t.  All control variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Industry fixed effects are 




Table 10: Random Interlocks 
            
VARIABLES Cscore ConNOAcc ConBTM absJM absJM_ROA 
            
AcctMeas_RT 0.313*** -0.0495 0.0540 -0.0287 0.0618 
(3.369) (-0.501) (0.892) (-1.150) (0.965) 
D_intoTie_RandomTie -0.0134 0.00242 -0.0117 -0.000460 -0.00431 
(-0.463) (0.159) (-0.341) (-0.0421) (-0.379) 
AcctMeas_RT*D_intoTie -0.0751 0.0517 -0.0864 0.0438 -0.0381 
(-1.013) (0.544) (-1.392) (1.480) (-0.501) 
Size -0.0280* 0.00886 0.0432** -0.00561 -0.00520 
(-1.670) (1.423) (2.458) (-1.385) (-1.019) 
Size_randomtie 0.0200 0.0101*** -0.0123 0.000843 0.00143 
(0.987) (2.712) (-0.912) (0.359) (0.659) 
M/B -0.00414 0.00154 0.0380*** -0.00140 -0.000799 
(-0.830) (0.797) (3.176) (-1.037) (-0.528) 
Leverage 0.0195 -0.00692 -0.180*** 0.0135 0.00485 
(0.543) (-0.403) (-4.206) (1.377) (0.455) 
Volatility 0.969** 0.181 -2.325*** -0.312 -0.0726 
(2.108) (0.622) (-3.905) (-1.202) (-0.243) 
SalesGrowth 0.0248 -0.0371 0.0249 0.00488 -0.0213 
(0.470) (-0.968) (0.501) (0.446) (-1.124) 
CFO -0.107 -0.355*** 0.569** 0.0630 0.133 
(-0.491) (-3.855) (2.525) (0.747) (1.364) 
Age -0.00284 -0.0307* -0.0340 -0.000115 -0.00216 
(-1.567) (-1.841) (-1.252) (-0.0157) (-0.179) 
Litigation -0.126 -0.104 0.244 0.275*** 0.229*** 
(-1.383) (-0.954) (1.132) (4.365) (3.078) 
BigNauditor 0.130*** 0.104** -0.0400 -0.00763 0.0104 
(6.056) (2.215) (-0.462) (-0.190) (0.216) 
SameIndustry_randomtie -0.0435 -0.0168 0.0198 0.00978 0.0157 
(-.489) (-0.445) (0.232) (0.444) (0.607) 
SameAud_randomtie 0.0208*** -0.0112 -0.0322 -0.00445 0.00879 
(6.499) (-0.766) (-1.278) (-0.335) (0.552) 
TieLength_randomtie 0.0154* 0.00201 -0.0146 0.00294 0.00377 
(1.712) (0.412) (-1.221) (0.646) (0.724) 
GeogProximity_randomtie 7.79e-05 0.000688 -0.00243 0.000615 0.00292 
















BoardIndep 0.00553 -0.0310*** 0.0730** 0.00389 0.0113 
(0.297) (-3.678) (2.340) (0.282) (1.063) 
BoardSize 0.00169 0.00242 -0.000645 
-
0.00315** -0.00207* 
(0.421) (0.456) (-0.102) (-2.122) (-1.775) 
Internal Funding -0.00778 0.0772 -0.493*** -0.0210 -0.0498*** 
(-0.173) (1.248) (-4.809) (-1.077) (-2.628) 
TangibleAssets -0.0943 -0.0358 -0.129 0.0620** 0.0441 
(-1.570) (-0.654) (-1.205) (2.195) (1.266) 
SimilarSize_randomtie -0.0363 0.0137 
-
0.0323*** 0.00322 -0.00540 
(-1.090) (1.412) (-2.878) (0.414) (-0.922) 
Degree -0.000653 -0.000965 -0.00123 0.000203 -0.000268 
(-0.345) (-0.449) (-0.321) (0.174) (-0.149) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Returns Included Yes 
Constant -0.0347 -0.142 -0.194 0.0685 -0.0152 
(-0.368) (-0.834) (-1.334) (1.126) (-0.232) 
Observations 651 448 634 565 565 
R-squared 0.420 0.493 0.725 0.530 0.372 
This table reruns the analysis of Table 5 with a different sample. A random sample of firms  
is selected to track their interlocks. For each focal firm, a interlocking firm with is considered  
its "random tie" if it’s the only interock of the focal firm during the testing window. The 
 testing window, identified by D_intoTie, is 1 for years during the tie and 0 and equal  
 number of years before the tie. The focal firm accounting measure is regressed on the  
random tie  accounting measure, D_intoTie and the interaction. All control variables are  
defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm and  year. Industry fixed  








Table 11: Difference in Difference 
Analysis 
            
VARIABLES Cscore ConNOAcc ConBTM absJM absJM_ROA 
            
D_intoTie 0.0152 -0.00932 0.0283 0.00725 -0.00747 
(0.967) (-0.894) (0.808) (1.157) (-0.658) 
FocalFirm -0.00179 -0.0193 -0.0137 -0.0326*** -0.0498*** 
(-0.122) (-1.442) (-0.354) (-5.298) (-4.824) 
AcctMeasCF  0.0898 0.0277 0.116* 0.0816 -0.0741 
(1.438) (0.369) (1.713) (0.300) (-0.461) 
AcctMeasCF*D_intoTie*FocalFirm 0.245* 0.406*** 0.108 0.314 (0.847) 
(1.686) (2.981) (1.094) (1.162) -0.172 
D_intoTie*AcctMeasCF -0.109 -0.0888 0.0257 -0.228 0.112 
(-1.317) (-0.818) (0.351) (-0.893) (0.461) 
FocalFirm*AcctMeasCF -0.0567 -0.261** -0.0744 -0.116 0.200 
(-0.408) (-2.321) (-0.954) (-0.374) (-0.618) 
D_intoTie*FocalFirm 0.0132 0.0215 0.0108 -0.00551 0.0119 
(0.694) (1.125) (0.217) (-0.673) (0.844) 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Returns Yes 
Constant -0.135 -0.00637 -0.142 0.636*** 0.269*** 
(-0.570) (-0.133) (-0.748) (10.87) (5.219) 
Observations 1,682 1,105 1,602 1,437 1,437 
R-squared 0.346 0.288 0.632 0.440 0.410 
This table presents a difference in difference model. Each focal firm is matched with a non-focal firm 
based on size. Each non-focal firm is linked  to the central firm connected to its matched focal firm. 
The non-focal firms serve as the control group in the regression. D_intoTie is coded 1 each year a 
focal firm is tied to a central firm and 0 an equal number of years prior. Non-focal firms follow the 
same coding as their matched focal firms for  D_intoTie. Focal firms is coded 1 if the firm is linked to 
a central firm and 0 if it is a non-focal firm. All control variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and year. Industry fixed effects are included.   *,**,*** indicate 







Essay 2: Municipal Accounting Quality 
Chapter 6:  Introduction 
This paper studies different manners of municipal reporting manipulation and 
institutional factors that affect tendency to manipulate. Municipalities use fund 
accounting which tracks each activity separately in self-balancing set of accounts. I 
focus on manipulation in the general fund, the largest fund, which uses governmental 
accounting, and the enterprise fund, which accounts for business-like operations and 
uses commercial-like accounting (Ruppel, 2010). I first investigate whether 
manipulation occurs and if so, how it occurs in each fund. Then I examine the 
institutional factors that affect the tendency to manipulate, thereby underscoring those 
circumstances. 
While the study is in the spirit of the corporate earnings management literature, 
institutional and accounting differences make ex-ante predictions unclear. In 
municipalities, elected officials, acting as agents of the citizen, use public funds 
obtained from the citizenry to provide public services (GASB, 2006). A second 
difference between the corporate and municipal setting is the accounting standards, 
which stresses accountability. Corporate accounting addresses accountability to 
shareholders by producing statements that emphasize financial performance. 
Municipalities, however, are accountable to the citizens, the main resources 
providers, to show how public funds were expended to provide services. (Granof and 




To that end, in addition to fund accounting, the general fund uses the current resource 
method,2 which matches the inflows and outflows of government in a given period. 
The striking difference is that only items affecting current year resources are reported, 
thus long term assets and liabilities are absent from the balance sheet. Accordingly, 
the statement of operations reports on net changes in working capital (“bottom line”) 
(Zimmerman, 1977).  
The general fund would have an incentive to report a small increase in its bottom line 
to avoid taxpayers demanding more services and/or reduction of taxes (Anthony, 
1985). At the same time, municipal officials could desire build up their fund balance 
to withstand economic shocks in the future (GFOA, 1990). Therefore, ex-ante, the 
direction of general fund manipulation is not clear. 
The incentives to manipulate enterprise fund earnings are less clear. While enterprise 
earnings could be managed downwards to keep in line with the overall objective of 
the municipality, they could also be managed upwards since enterprise funds are 
operated similar to commercial entities (Ruppel, 2010). However, if municipal 
officials concentrate their efforts on the general fund since it receives the most 
attention from users (Raman, 1981), then they may not exert effort to manipulate 
earnings in the enterprise funds.  
Municipalities have different institutions and accounting from corporations and prior 
literature has documented that institutions impact corporate outcomes (La Porta et al, 
2000 and La Porta et al 2002). As a result, ex-ante, there is reason to believe that if 
                                                 





municipal manipulation occurs, it occurs for different reasons. Furthermore, this 
setting allows me to investigate how two dissimilar entities within the same 
organization respond to reporting pressures and how those differences manifest 
themselves with respect to accounting manipulation. Additionally, my study will 
answer an unexplored part of the literature: the accounting quality of municipalities. 
With municipalities comprising 10.5% of the U.S. economy in 2001 (Census of 
Government, 2001), my study seeks to better understand financial reporting for a 
significant part of the economy. 
Using a sample of 103 municipalities from 2001- 2003, I examine manipulation using 
techniques of each brands of accounting. First, I inspect if interfund transfers are used 
to bias the bottom line in either fund. Operating transfers are shifts of money between 
funds that can occur to subsidize the receiving fund, to account for long term 
interfund loans, and other reimbursements. Although transfers have a legitimate 
purpose, there remains discretion in their use. For example, if the general fund were 
to transfer more money than needed to the debt service fund, it could create a “rainy 
day” fund to draw from in future years when the general fund needs it while still 
showing the desired general fund balance in the current year. I control for legitimate 
economic reasons for the transfers by including financial condition of other funds in 
the municipality and prior year general fund transfers in the analysis. 
I find that net transfers (transfers in less transfers out) are used in the general fund to 
systematically manipulate its bottom line downward but had no such usage in the 
enterprise fund. I then find that there is a negative relationship between operating 




but a similar analysis into general fund accruals yielded no results. The results 
suggest that each fund manipulates downward using its own brand of accounting.  
Next, I look at institutional factors that could exacerbate or mitigate manipulation in 
each fund. Prior literature has documented that particular institutional factors affect 
corporate earnings management (Luez et al, 2003). In municipalities, citizens have an 
incentive to monitor their elected official to ensure that the public treasury is used 
shrewdly (Downs, 1957). I include a series of variables that measure citizen 
influence. I also argue that municipal councils, which are the legislative bodies for 
municipalities, can influence accounting practices similar to how strong corporate 
boards have been linked to favorable outcomes (Laux and Laux, 2008).  
Municipalities also face various external pressures that could impact the tendency to 
manipulate. Creditors react to municipal financial information (Wallace, 1981) and 
municipal bond ratings are based on their ability to sustain operations via their fund 
balance (S&P, 1999). I use binary variable if the municipality issued a bond in the 
prior year. Since municipalities are also subject to additional reporting requirements 
as a condition of the continuation of state and federal grants (Chan, 1981), I use 
intergovernmental revenue as to proxy this incentive. In addition, labor unions use 
financial information during negotiations (Anthony, 1985) and therefore use pension 
costs, after controlling for municipality size, to measure relative union strength. 
In the general fund, I find that the interaction between pre-transfer income and 
“citizen” variables were generally negative while the interaction with “council” 
variables was mostly positive. This suggests that higher citizen involvement is 




rises. Higher pension costs and intergovernmental revenue were also associated with 
downward manipulation while the affect of a bond issuance was not significant. 
However, a similar analysis in the enterprise fund using discretionary accruals yielded 
no results.  
Additional analysis revealed that general funds over their budgeted pre-transfer 
income were more likely to transfer more money out of the fund. As a sensitivity 
check, I model Net Transfers to calculate discretionary net transfers and find that the 
results are robust to the use of this variable as well. In addition, I find that each fund 
uses its preferred manipulation method to offset increases in the other method.  
This paper makes five contributions. First, to my knowledge, this paper is the first to 
document accounting manipulation in U.S municipalities. This finding compliments 
the finding that non-profit hospitals use accruals to manage earnings towards zero 
(Leone and Van Horne, 2005) and corporate literature that has largely documented 
that firms manage earnings up (Healy, 1985, Burgstahler and Eames 1998, and 
DeFond and Jimbalvo, 1994). My results underscore the important link between 
institutional incentives and the direction of accounting manipulation.  Second, I show 
that although there is evidence that both general and enterprise funds manipulated 
their reporting downwards, each fund used a method consistent with its brand of 
accounting. Whereas corporate literature has used firm-wide measures of earnings 
management (Jones, 1991), this unique setting allows me to show that municipal 
officials are sophisticated enough to achieve the same objective using parallel 




Third, I shed light on how institutional forces affect municipal reporting. Namely, 
citizen influence, union and granting agency pressure lead to downward 
manipulation. Also, councils that are more active and removed from oversight 
manipulate upwards to project financial viability. This finding should have 
implications for policy setters in determining effective municipal institutional 
features. The paper also underscores the importance of the budget and its influence in 
shaping financial reports. However, those institutional forces played virtually no role 
in enterprise fund manipulation. Again, the corporate setting assumes the entire firm 
faces similar external pressures but these results indicate that even within the same 
organization, divisions are not uniformly affected by outside factors.  
Fourth, my paper also provides evidence about the interactive effect between methods 
of manipulation. This finding adds to the corporate literature that suggests the use of 
multiple earnings management method by showing its application in a novel setting. 
Finally, my paper also raises the possibility that Big 4 auditors audit municipalities 
differently than corporations. I find that they either had no effect of were associated 
with higher levels of discretionary accruals, which suggests that Big 4 firms may not 
view these matters as substantially as they do in the corporate setting.  
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows: Chapter 7 presents the motivation, 
Chapter 8 lays out the hypothesis development, Chapter 9 discusses the design and 







Chapter 7: Motivation 
7.1 Municipal Significance 
Municipalities comprise a significant portion of the U.S. economy. In 2001, the first 
year of my sample, local governments collected revenue of $1.06 trillion including 
$354 billion in taxes (Census of Government, 2001). They also had total expenditures 
including capital outlays of $1.07 trillion, which accounts for 10.6% of US GDP of 
$10.1 trillion in 2001. In 2001 local governments had a total debt of $977 billion 
while the federal debt level stood at 5.8 trillion. Local governments maintained their 
standing during the decade. In 2008, the most recent year of data availability shows 
that local governments $1.59 trillion which accounted for 10.8% of US GDP and 
amassed debt totaling $1.54 trillion.  
7.2 Institutional Features 
The municipal principal-agent relationship is a departure from the model assumed in 
the corporate setting. Shareholders, who voluntarily purchase shares, are the 
corporate owners and they hire a manager to operate the business to create a return on 
their initial investment (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore corporate accounting 
emphasizes financial performance as a measure of “how management has discharged 
its stewardship responsibility to owners for the use of enterprise resources entrusted 
to it” (FASB Concept Statement 4).  
In municipalities, on the other hand, elected officials are the agents of its citizens and 
are charged with providing public services in accordance with public policy goals 




taxes from the citizenry to finance services. Since the taxpayers,3 the principals, are 
involuntary resource providers (GASB, 2006), they have an incentive to monitor the 
elected officials, the agents, to ensure that the public funds are shrewdly expended 
(Downs, 1957, Zimmerman, 1977).  
Accounting standards are a second difference between the municipal and corporate 
setting. Municipal accounting stresses accountability with regards to public funds as a 
main objective (GASB Concept Statement 1). To that end, inter-period equity is a 
fundamental principle in governmental accounting. Inter-period equity holds that each 
year’s resources should be adequate to pay for the services provided that year, 
“thereby avoiding shifting a burden to future taxpayers for services previously 
provided” (GASB, 2006). 
In line with this principle, governments use the current resource method which only 
focuses on current resources as opposed to economic resource method used in 
commercial enterprises. The striking difference is that only items affecting current 
year resources are reported, thus long term assets and liabilities are absent from the 
balance sheet. Such items are recorded in full in the year they occur. For example, if a 
city purchases a new fleet of automobiles with cash, it would simply record as an 
expenditure for the autos and the corresponding reduction in cash. Likewise, a sale of 
an asset would be recorded as an inflow on the statement of operations (akin to the 
income statement), not just the gain portion. The current resource method tries to 
match the amounts spent by government in with the amounts received by government 
in a given period. Accordingly, the statement of operations reports on net changes in 
                                                 





working capital (Zimmerman, 1977).  
Another unique feature of governmental accounting is its use fund accounting. A fund 
is a self balancing set of accounts and is a separate reporting entity. Governments will 
set up funds based on legal and contractual guidelines or management judgment.  
Funds are used so governments are more fully accountable for public resources 
obtained for specific reasons. 
By far, the largest fund on a government’s ledger is the general fund, which is the 
catch-all account that records any transaction not classified into the other funds. It is 
also the most significant fund the government has and receives the most scrutiny 
when analyzing the overall financial situation of a government (Ruppel, 2010 and 
Raman 81).  
Another fund of interest is the enterprise fund which accounts for business like 
operations such as utilities and sanitation that the municipality may provide. 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) statement 34 suggests that 
enterprise funds can be established when a government charges fees for an activity 
but mandates a fund be set up when the activity is financed by revenue bonds or the 
fees charged are intended to recover cost. These funds are financed and operated as 
commercial enterprises (Ruppel, 2010) and therefore there is no concern about 
preserving inter-period equity. Accordingly, they use commercial accounting 
standards including full accrual and the economic resource method and therefore 
report on periodic income4.  
 
                                                 





7.3 Literature Review  
Municipal accounting literature has documented the effect of accounting to creditors. 
Wallace (1981) finds that accounting and auditing variables are associated with bond 
ratings and interest cost. Wilson and Howard (1984) find that weak financial 
performance leads to higher interest costs while Gore (2004) finds that financial 
disclosure and bond insurance serve as substitutes.   
Another set of papers has focused on factors influencing disclosure. Evans and Patton 
(1983) documented that municipal population, debt and presence of a municipal 
manager were all associated a municipality being awarded the GFOA certificate for 
quality disclosures. Copley (1991) also found that municipalities with Big 8 audit 
firms tended to disclose more.   
More recent papers have explored irregularities. Gore (2009) finds that cities with 
more volatile revenue or less revenue sources accumulate higher levels of cash. Baber 
et al (2011) finds that municipalities with restatements subsequently experience 
higher interest costs but that restatements are less likely in the presence of a Big 4 
auditor and voter intervention. Two empirical papers, Stalebrink (2007) and Pilcher 
and Van der Zan (2010) are of a similar spirit to this one. Stalebrink (2007) examines 
Swedish cities and finds that those cities use discretionary accruals to lower profit and 
Pilcher and Van der Zan (2010) find that cities in Australia and New Zealand use 
depreciation expense to adjust their reported profit.  
These studies provide intuition for my study but all three countries sampled in these 
studies have different government accounting rules than the U.S. In those countries, 




variables like depreciation and accruals can be isolated. Because of the different 
standards, these papers only look at the overall profit of the city. However, because of 
the fund accounting in the U.S, I can separately examine the general fund, which uses 
the current resource method, with the enterprise fund, which uses economic resource 
method.  
Municipalities offer a unique setting to examine the link between organizational 
incentives and accounting methods. Corporate literature has widely assumed that the 
entire organization has the same reporting pressure (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
Consequently, earnings management studies have been focused on firm-wide 
measures intended at capturing firm wide earnings management (Jones, 1991). The 
municipal setting allows me to test differing incentives within an organization to see 
if each fund is subject to the same reporting pressures. By examining distinct units 
within the overall entity, I can test whether incentives differ between subunits and if 
so, whether the differing accounting rules play a part in the manipulation. 
7.4 General Fund Incentives 
In the municipal setting, managers have many funds to contend with but the general 
fund is the largest fund and receives the most attention when assessing the financial 
condition of a city (Ruppel, 2010). As mentioned, the statement of operations of the 
general fund reports on the change in working capital and is intended to reflect the 
degree to which the fund was able to pay for its services with current inflows. This 
figure which represents “bottom line” for the general fund is how users determine the 
performance of a municipality (Raman, 1981). Consequently, a decrease in the 




that the municipality had to finance current activity with prior year funds, thereby 
breaching inter period equity. For example, the State of Maryland Legislative Auditor 
reported on the financial condition of cities in the state and labeled cities with a 
negative bottom line as having a “negative trend.” (State of Maryland, 2010).     
Conversely, showing a large increase in the bottom line can also be a poor signal. 
Although a large increase in the working capital may seem commendable, the 
implication is that the municipality collected more taxes than needed.  Such a 
situation may prompt taxpayers to call for a limit of their taxes and/or require more 
services be provided (Lipnick et al, 1999). A large increase in the bottom line can 
also embolden labor to make higher demands and could jeopardize some of the grants 
a municipality receives from state and federal agencies (Anthony, 1985).  
Accordingly, the ideal target for the General Fund’s change in working capital would 
be a small positive increase (Raman, 1981). 
Nonetheless, showing a larger increase in working capital could have its operational 
benefits. The Governmental Finance Officers Association (GFOA) recommends that 
municipalities build up their fund balance to withstand economic shocks in the future 
(GFOA, 1990). This practice would allow continuity of municipal services and for a 
consistent tax rate even in downturn years (Marlowe, 2005). Credit rating agencies 
evaluate municipalities based on their ability to sustain operations via their fund 
balance (S&P, 1999).  
Although there might be conflicting arguments about which direction to manipulate 
the general fund bottom line, extant literature has documented that the officials 




makes it clear that public officials are motivated by their own self interest (Chan and 
Rubin, 1987). Politicians seek reelection and thus are often fixated on the short term 
(Giroux, 1989), mainly for reelection purposes and are willing to compromise or add 
services to gain a constituency for reelection (Svara, 1999). City managers, who act 
as the chief operating officer of the municipality and handle the bureaucracy, are 
motivated by income for performance and reputational concerns. (Giroux, 1989). 
Given the demands and important uses of financial information, it would appear that 
municipal officials have a basis to manipulate their financial reporting to favorably 
influence the opinion of the end user. However, the direction of such manipulation 
remains an empirical question thus leading to my first hypothesis stated in the null 
form: 
H1: The net change in working capital in the general fund is not 
systematically manipulated in either direction. 
7.5 Enterprise Fund Incentives 
GASB 34 declares that enterprise funds need to be established when a governmental 
activity charges fees to recover costs, which implies that  according standard setters, 
the objective of the enterprise fund is to record zero profit.  The zero profit constraint 
of enterprise funds would not only parallel the objective of the rest of the 
municipality but also it would make them resemble a non-profit organization. In fact, 
prior research has found that nonprofit hospitals manage their earnings downwards to 
reach that threshold (Leone and Van Horn, 2005). 
Enterprise funds often operate with little or no competition and therefore can wield 




profits from enterprise funds can be used to finance services provided by the rest of 
the municipality (DiLorenzo, 1982). Taken together, enterprise funds could be trying 
to maximize profits.      
However, whether the target is zero or maximum profits, the question of manipulation 
would only be relevant if the fund was deemed important. Although enterprise funds 
may share the zero profit motives with non-profit organizations, those organizations 
manage earnings for the whole entity because the entire entity faces the same external 
pressures. Municipalities, however, have multiple funds but the general fund receives 
the bulk of attention when analyzing the finances of the municipality (Raman, 1981). 
Therefore, reporting pressures for the government as a whole fall onto the general 
fund. But it is unclear if those pressures transfer to the enterprise fund.  
On one hand, municipal officials may concentrate their efforts on the general fund 
since it receives the most attention from users. If this is the case, then those officials 
would not exert effort to manipulate earnings in the enterprise funds. Conversely, if 
municipal officials believe the enterprise fund represents meaningful and significant 
information to users, then they may also wish to present more favorable accounting 
numbers in the enterprise fund. Therefore, it remains an open empirical question as to 
whether enterprise fund accounting is managed. This leads to my second hypothesis 
stated in the null form:  
H2: The change in net assets in the enterprise fund is not systematically 






7.6 Cross Sectional Hypotheses 
The first two hypotheses focused on whether manipulation happens. Accounting 
manipulation, though, can be affected by institutional factors. Luez (2003), for 
example, notes that differences between countries in investor protection laws explain 
earnings management. Firms in countries with stronger investor protection laws also 
have higher valuation (LaPorta et al, 2002). As the municipal setting uses two 
accounting systems, evidence about accounting quality between international 
standards can inform this study. Firms in countries that adopt international standards 
have higher accounting quality and information content (Barth et al 2008, and 
Landsman et al 2011). Chin et al (2011) provide evidence that states manipulate their 
accounting ahead of elections. 
Likewise, the municipal setting has different institutional factors that vary in degree 
that could alter the direction and manner of the accounting manipulation. While 
citizens theoretically have the role to monitor municipal officials, they make lack 
ability to do so because it would be too costly for each citizen (Zimmerman, 1977). 
However, citizens use financial information for voting and relocation decisions 
(Copley et al, 1997). Indeed, Ingram and Copeland (1981) find that financial ratios 
have an incremental impact in the outcome of municipal elections suggesting that 
voters are implicitly aware of financial information when making voting decisions. 
Brender et al. (2003) supports this conclusion by finding that fiscal performance 
influences the outcome of mayoral election results in Israel. In addition, municipal 
accounting literature has consistently found that municipalities with larger 




narrative (Evans and Patton, 1983 and Giroux and Mclelland, 2003). Therefore, 
municipal officials understand that citizens are aware of the financial information and 
that they generally disprove of large increases in fund balance. 
Manipulation could also be affected by a variety of other external factors. A stream of 
papers have documented that creditors reacts to municipal financial information. 
Bond rating changes have been associated with changes in its financial condition 
(Wallace, 1981, Copeland et al 1982 Ingram, 1983) while cost of debt has been 
shown to be lower for municipalities with higher levels of financial disclosure 
(Wilson and Howard 1984, Gore et al 2004 and Gore 2004). Since creditors are 
interested in a municipality’s ability to repay its debt, bond rating agencies 
recommend a municipality’s fund balance be large enough to cover 5-15% of 
operating expenditures (GFAO, 1990). Therefore, creditors could counteract the 
incentive to show a small bottom line and allow municipal officials to build up their 
fund balance.  
Another external factor could be state and federal agencies. Most municipalities 
receive grants from these agencies and they are subject to additional reporting 
requirements to ensure grant money is expended properly and assess future eligibility 
(Chan, 1981, Broadus and Comtais, 1985). Securing such aide becomes easier with 
the report of a deficit (Zimmerman, 1977). In addition, labor unions base their 
demands on the financial condition of the municipality (Anthony, 1985). Zimmerman 
(1977) suggests that municipalities would have an easier time negotiating with unions 
if their financial statements look weaker. Indeed Gore (2012) supports this claim. She 




general fund. Therefore, a municipality with greater amounts of grant money or 
facing labor union demands could wish to manage downwards. 
A municipality’s council features can also affect its tendency to manipulate 
accounting reports. Municipal councils, which are the legislative bodies for 
municipalities, can influence accounting practices similar to how strong corporate 
boards have been shown to reduce earnings management (Laux and Laux, 2008). 
Similarly, municipal councils where the mayor sits on the board or can vote have 
higher cash reserves (Gore, 2009). Therefore, the council could impact the 
manipulation behavior. All of these factors together lead to the following: 






















Chapter 8:  Design and Data 
8.1  Design  
 
The focus of my study is to determine if municipal officials to manipulate the 
“bottom line” in the general and enterprise funds. I first examine the use of operating 
transfers. Although each fund is a separate self balancing set of accounts, the 
government can transfer monies between accounts. Operating transfers can occur to 
subsidize the receiving fund (Anthony, 1985), to account for long term interfund 
loans, and other reimbursements. For example, a debt service fund may be set up to 
account for debt repayments. But since this fund generates no revenue on its own, it is 
subsidized by the general fund via transfers.   
Although transfers have a legitimate purpose, there remains a lot of discretion about 
how and when to use them. For example, if the general fund were to transfer more 
money than needed to the debt service fund, it could create a “rainy day” fund to 
draw from in future years when the general fund needs it while still showing the 
desired general fund balance. Anthony (1985) notes that cities can use transfers to 
“vary the treatment of the deficit or surplus” and explains that in 1980 New York City 
was able to reduce an initial surplus of $551 million to only a $23 million increase 
using various accounting tricks including transfers. New York provides an interesting 
case study because of its financial troubles in the late 1970s. In an SEC staff report, 
the SEC notes that the city transferred $35 million into the general fund to mask the 
underlying deficit (SEC, 1977). In addition, in 1985 and 1993, the GAO studied the 
effect of state balanced budget amendments on state budgeting practicing. They found 




(GAO, 1985 and1993). These analyses underscore the significance of the bottom line 
in government accounting and the discretion municipal managers have over operating 
transfers to reach a palatable bottom line. In order to control for natural economic 
reasons for transfers, I include variables to capture the financial health of other funds 
as well as prior year’s net transfers to provide for an expectation of transfers. The net 
transfers model is presented below for both funds: 
NetTransfersi,t= β0 + β1PreTransferIncomei,t + β2CityFormi,t  + β3AssetRatoi,t 
+β4BegFundBalance(NetAssets)i,t +β5OtherFinancingSourcesi,t β6Populationi,t 
β7LagNetTransferi,t β8PreTransferIncome_OtherFundsi,t 
+β9BegFundBalance_OtherFundsi,t +β10OtherFinancingSources_OtherFundsti,t  + ε 
NetTransfers is the total of transfers into the each fund minus transfers out from that 
fund. Pre-Transfer Income is revenue less expenditures, which in the general fund is 
labeled  Surplus/Deficit and is labeled Income Before Transfers in the enterprise fund. 
If municipal officials are using transfers to manipulate the general fund bottom line 
into showing a small increase in bottom line, then when the fund has large pre-
transfer income, there should be more transfers out. Conversely, if there were a deficit 
in pre-transfer income, there would be more transfers in to increase the bottom line. 
Accordingly,   is expected to have a negative coefficient. There should be no 
relationship between transfers and pre transfer income in the same way one would not 
expect a relationship between a corporation’s income from continuing operation and 
its extraordinary item. A statistical relationship though would indicate that discretion 




The remaining regressors serve as controls. City Form is coded 1 if the municipality 
has a mayor-council form and 0 if it has a manager-council form. The mayor-council 
form grants the mayor the authority of the chief executive. The mayor is in this form 
is to oversee the administration of the municipality as well as its functions. In the 
manager-council form structure, a city manager is appointed by the municipal council 
to be the chief executive and the mayor functions as the head of the city council and 
attends to mostly “ceremonial” duties (Wikstrom, 1979). In both instances, the 
council acts as the municipal legislature. Prior studies have found that manager-
council cities have higher quality of disclosure and better financial condition (Evans 
and Patton, 1983, Giroux and McLelland, 2003 and Laswad et al, 2005). The intuition 
behind these finds are that since city managers are appointed by the council, they are 
less sensitive to political pressures and therefore are driven by to enhance their 
reputation. 
Asset Ratio is the ratio of the total assets of the general fund to the combined total 
assets in all the governmental funds. This controls for the relative size of the general 
fund compared to the rest of the funds and the natural tendency of the largest funds to 
finance the smaller ones. I control for Population to mitigate the effect of 
municipality size and I control for LaggedNetTransfers to provide a reasonable 
baseline for the expected net transfers. BegFundBalance is the beginning balance of 
fund balance in the general fund and controls for the ability of municipal officials to 
draw down on previous year’s performance to finance current year operations and 
thus avoid transfers. This is referred to as Beginning Net Assets in the enterprise fund. 




the general fund bottom line. I include Pre-Transfer Income, BegFundBalance and 
OtherFinancingSources for governmental funds. For the general (enterprise) fund 
model, I include the same variables for enterprise (general) fund. The inclusion of the 
financial variables of the other funds controls for economic reasons for interfund 
transfers. All financial variables are scaled by Average Assets of each fund, 
respectively. State and year fixed effects are included in each model. 
Next, I test whether discretionary accruals are used to manipulate. Accruals have been 
shown in corporate and non-profit settings to manage earnings therefore, examining 
their impact in the municipal setting is important, especially since enterprise funds 
use commercial-like accounting. I estimate the Jones Model for each yearly cross-
section and calculate the discretionary portion of accruals from the following: 
,   =    + ∆ , ,  
TA is total accruals and is calculated as enterprise fund bottom line (change in net 
assets) minus cash flow from operations. Total accruals are regressed on the change 
in revenue and property, plant and equipment of the fund.  
After the discretionary accruals were calculated, I then sought to determine of 
discretionary accruals were systematically being used to manipulate the enterprise 
fund operating figures downward. To do this, I regressed Discretionary Accruals 
(DiscAcc) on Pre-Transfers Income Before Discretionary Accruals (PTIDA), 
calculated for each enterprise fund as Pre-Transfers Income less Discretionary 
Accruals. If discretionary accruals were being used to manage enterprise earnings 
down, then there would be a negative relationship between PTIDA and DiscAcc. I 




DiscAcc because corporate literature has found discretionary accruals to be linked to 
prior performance and control for autocorrelation in DiscAcc (Leone and Van Horne, 
2005). I also control for City Form and population. The model is presented below: 
, =  + ( , ) + .  + .   +Controls+ ε 
I attempt to conduct a similar analysis for the general fund. However because the 
general fund does not carry long term assets and GASB does not require a statement 
of cash flows for the general, the Jones Model could not be computed. Nevertheless, I 
attempt to model accruals for the general fund by defining accruals as the change in 
working capital as Dechow and Dichev (2002). In this setting since only current items 
are reported, working capital amounts to total assets minus total liabilities. This 
formulation leads to accruals essentially capturing the fund balance of the general 
fund. Thus, the change in working capital would amount to the change in fund 
balance, the bottom line, for the general fund. I propose that the change in working 
capital is a function the change in total revenues and total other financing sources. 
Including total other financing sources controls for all other financing that could 
affect fund balance. The model is presented below: 
,   =    + ∆ , ,  
The model is run for each annual cross section and the residual is calculated for each 
general fund. I calculate DiscAcc_GF as the residual from the regression above and 
then regress DiscAcc_GF on the Pre-Transfers Income less DiscAcc_GF (PTIDA), 
prior year Pre-Transfer Income (PTI) and prior year DiscAcc_GF. I also control for 




_ , =  + ( , ) + .  + + _ . Controls + ε 
 8.2 Data 
I compile my sample from the International City Manager Association (ICMA) 2001 
Form of Government Survey. The ICMA survey is conducted every five years to 
describe the governmental structures of municipalities. I choose the 2001 period 
because variables needed for cross sectional analysis were only available in the 2001 
survey. The survey includes 4,245 municipalities but in keeping with prior literature, 
I focus municipalities with populations over 25,000. This limits to my initial sample 
to 631. To those municipalities, I email a request for the municipalities financial 
reports for the years 2001-2003. I use reports from the year 2000 to obtain lagged 
variable information. I had 135 municipalities reply (21%) but 32 of those replies 
could not provide all the requested years. Therefore, my final sample included 103 
municipalities. My sample includes municipalities from 24 states. California and 
Ohio combine for 56 municipalities.5 I manually collected the requisite financial data 
from the financial reports.  
Table 1 shows that the average municipality has a population of 91,368 in 2000 and 
that the mayor-council form was present 34% of municipalities. The general fund 
reported $35.8 million in assets. Also, the general fund assets accounted for 39% of 
all governmental fund assets, underscoring the significance of this fund. The 
univariate results show that general fund Pre-Transfer Income  reported is $.10  but 
                                                 
 




that the average net transfer is $(.09) resulting in a bottom line of $.005 This would 
seem to lend support for the notion that transfers are used to favorably manipulate the 
bottom line downward to only show a small increase.  
The average size enterprise fund was $304 million but when comparing enterprise 
current assets to governmental assets, the Enterprise Ratio is 42%. This figure shows 
the magnitude of enterprise funds but since governmental funds (the denominator) do 
not include enterprise assets, a direct comparison of the Enterprise Ratio and General 
Fund Ratio would be inaccurate. The beginning value of net assets (akin to beginning 
retained earnings) is $.78. The Income before transfers is $.02 with net transfers 















Chapter 9: Results 
 9.1 Transfer Analysis 
Table 2 presents the general fund net transfers model. Column 1 regresses Net 
Transfers on only the Pre-Transfer Income  of the general fund. The analysis shows 
that Pre-Transfer Income has a negative and significant relationship with Net 
Transfers (   = .88 and t-stat -8.23). In column 2, the control variables from the 
governmental fund are added to the regression. Again, Pre-Transfer Income  has a 
negative coefficient and significant coefficient (   = .92 and t=-13.89). These results 
imply that a one standard deviation increase in Pre-Transfer Income decreases the Net 
Transfer by $.94 per capita. BegFundBalance, Other Financing Sources and 
Population all had negative and significant coefficients at the 1% level suggesting 
that when the general fund has enough reserves or has other financing sources, it may 
transfer more money out to other funds. It also suggests that in larger municipalities, 
the general fund is tasked with subsidizing more of the other funds. Lagged Net 
Transfers was positive and significant at the 1% level. Non of the governmental fund 
variables loaded significantly. Because not all municipalities have enterprise funds, I 
conduct a separate regression by adding enterprise fund control variables in Column 
3. The results are very similar to Column 2. 
In Column 4, I examine the possibility that the increase in Pre-Transfer was reducing 
Net Transfers but Net Transfers were still positive. I run a logit model where the 
dependent variable is coded 1 if the general fund Net Transfers were negative 
(indicating more transfers out) with the same regressors. This model shows that Pre-




bolsters the findings in Panel A by suggesting that increasing our pre-transfer income 
is positively related to transferring more money out of the general fund.  
In unreported results, I also examine the possibility that Other Financing Sources are 
being used to also manipulate the general fund bottom line. Accordingly, I rerun the 
analysis in Panel A only for observations that have no Other Financing Sources. 
Again, the coefficient for Pre-Transfer Income is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. This indicates that Other Financing Sources are not driving the results. The 
statistically significant relationship suggests that, even after controlling for economic 
reasons for transfers, interfund transfers are being used to manipulate the bottom line 
of the general fund.     
Table 3 display the model net transfer model for the enterprise fund. Column 1, which 
regresses Net Transfers on Pre-Transfer Income has a negative but insignificant 
coefficient (   = .05 and t=.27). When control variables were added in Column 2 and 
3, the coefficients likewise remained insignificant. 
Again, in Column 4 of Table 3 I conduct a logit to predict the probability of having a 
negative Net Transfer out of the enterprise fund but Pre-Transfer Income yielded an 
insignificant coefficient. I also reran the analysis in Panel A on the subsample with no 
Other financing sources and again the Income before transfers had an insignificant 
coefficient. 
Taken together, the analysis suggests that net transfers are used to systematically 
decrease the bottom line in general fund but no such relation exists in enterprise fund 





9.2 Discretionary Accruals Analysis 
Table 4 presents the results of the enterprise discretionary accrual regressions. 
Column 1, without controls, PTIDA has a negative and significant coefficient (   = -
.71 and t =4.69). In Column 3 with all the control variables, again, PTIDA shows a 
significantly negative coefficient (   = -.69 and t=8.23). In fact, if IBTBDA were to 
increase by one standard deviation, DiscAcc would decrease by .88 per capita. This 
suggests that municipal officials are using discretionary accruals to manage their 
operating income downwards in the enterprise fund. 
Table 5 shows that the corresponding general fund analysis. PTIDA has an 
insignificant coefficient when regressed alone and when the controls are added. This 
provides some evidence that discretionary accruals are not to systematically bias 
accounting numbers in the general fund. However, this result should be examined 
with caution as the model may be picking up the effects of changes in fund balance 
and not necessarily just discretionary accruals.  
9.3 Cross Sectional Analysis 
The results presented in Table 2 indicate that municipal officials are using their 
discretion with regards to transfers to manipulate the general fund bottom line. Now 
to examine the cross sectional hypotheses, I will look at a set of variables that may 
mitigate or exacerbate the tendency. 
The first dimension I will examine deals with the citizens. The strongest monitoring 
tool they have is their voting power. To capture this, I measure political competition, 
defined as the proportion of city council members that ran and lost for re-election in 




monitoring by the citizens has been shown as a factor that influences the quality of 
municipal disclosure (Baber, 1983) so it could be relevant in this context as well. 
Also, I examine how the mayor is elected because depending on who appoints the 
mayor could alter the incentives to manipulate. I code Mayoral Election Method 1 if 
the mayor is selected by direct vote and 0 if selected by the council and include City 
Form. Prior literature has found that municipalities led by a mayor as opposed to a 
manager have worse performance and disclosure (Giroux  and Mclelland, 2003). The 
reasoning is that because are direct agents of the citizens, they are more sensitive to 
political incentives.  
I also capture citizen monitoring pressures by examining if the municipality allows 
for citizen initiatives. These initiatives allow for “direct democracy” and give citizens 
more influence in government. Citizen initiative is coded 1 if it exists in a 
municipality. Likewise, I code Recall 1 if the municipality allows the citizens to 
remove an elected official from office. Municipalities with these provisions could 
empower citizens to be more attentive about monitoring their officials. I also examine 
the role of citizen boards, which are a collection of residents either appointed or 
elected to serve an advisory or policymaking role regarding specific issues. Citizen 
boards have a stated goal of involving the citizens in the policy making process. A 
ramification though could be that these boards, although mainly advisory, serve as a 
monitoring tool for public officials. The close involvement of citizens in government 
could act as a “perceived” monitoring mechanism.  Citizen board is coded 1 if it 
exists in the municipality. I also include Mayoral Term Length and Population to 




I next measure creditor pressure with a binary variable, Bond Issue, which is set to 1 
if the municipality issued a bond in the previous year. A similar variable is 
constructed for the enterprise fund bond issuances. Corporate literature has shown 
that creditors play an oversight role and enhance reporting quality and municipal 
research has documented that creditors react to municipal financial information. 
Creditors have oversight through bond covenants and therefore a bond issuance 
would capture the extent of creditor monitoring.  
In order to capture the effect of state and federal aid on manipulation incentives, I 
measure Intergovernmental revenue, which is coded 1 if the general fund’s state and 
federal grant revenue is in the top quintile in the prior year. Having a lot of 
intergovernmental revenue indicates heavier reliance on those agencies and thus, 
potentially, more incentive for manipulation. 
Labor unions are another external force that could influence the tendency to 
manipulate accounting. Labor unions negotiate with municipal managers on a host of 
issues including wages and benefits, foremost among them is pension contributions. 
Pension contributions are a part of the contractual agreement between the unions and 
the municipality. Since pension contributions can vary with municipality size, I first 
regress pension costs on municipality population and calculate the residual. The 
residual represents pension costs above and beyond factors that are tied to 
municipality size and approximates the influence of the labor union. I code Pension 
Cost 1 if the municipality’s pension cost residual is in the top quintile of all residuals 




I also inspect characteristics of the council itself.  Municipalities have a staggered 
council if council member terms are spread out. Corporate literature documents that 
firms with staggered boards are less likely to engage in earnings management because 
those managers become entrenched and have less incentives (Zhao and Chen, 2008). 
Yet another possibility is because of the staggered terms, there is greater continuity 
on the council which allows it to focus on the long term outlook of the municipality 
and not worry so much about imminent reelection concerns. Municipal evidence on 
staggered councils suggests that municipalities with staggered councils have higher 
agency problems which lead to higher city manager salaries (Gore, 2009). Staggered 
board is measured as a binary variable.  
Council term limits are likewise another feature that could impact accounting 
manipulation. If the incentive of re-election is removed, presumably political officials 
will behave differently. In addition, I examine the effect of council size, frequency of 
council meetings the number of business executives on the council and the number of 
standing committees in the council. These features also draw on corporate findings 
that the size, activity and experience of a corporate board determine its effectiveness 
(Cheng 2008, DeFond et al, 2005 and .Core et al, 1999). I measure Council Size as 
the number of members on the council, Frequency as the number of times a council 
meets per year and Bus Exec is coded 1 if a business executive sits on the council. 
Standing Committee is coded 1 if the number of standing committees on the council is 
in the top quintile of all standing committees. Another feature I examine is whether 
the mayor sits on the council. I also inspect the effect of having a mayor on the 




Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for these variables. Political Competition was 
18% meaning that 82% of incumbents won re-election. In 30% of municipalities, the 
voters directly selected the mayor while 81% of municipalities allow for a citizen 
initiative. Fifty two percent of municipalities issued bonds in the prior year while 
35% of enterprise funds did the same. Intergovernmental revenues were 1.6 times 
general fund assets. In 17% of municipalities, council members had term limits and. 
A staggered council exists in 75% of municipalities and the average council had 1.85 
standing committees.  
In Table 7, each column shows the results of the base model for the general fund with 
the addition of the variable and interaction term. I run a separate regression for each 
interacting variable to maximize the power of my tests. Many of the variables, 
particularly the ones from the ICMA survey, are not complete for the entire dataset so 
one regression with all the variables would severely limit the number of observations. 
The interaction between Pre-Transfer Income (PTI) and Citizen Boards is negative 
and significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the interaction with Citizen Initiatives (   = 
-.25 and t=-2.22), City Form (   = -.32 and t=-3.97), Mayoral Term Length (   = -.11 
and t=-3.11), and Method Mayor Election (   = -.21 and t=-2.75), each has a 
significantly negative coefficient. In addition, the interaction with Population and 
Recall are also a negative but insignificant coefficient. Taken together, this evidence 
suggests that in the presence of these citizen oversight variables, as Pre-Transfer 
Income increases, the general fund is more likely to transfer money out to show a 




elect the mayor or in the functioning of government, officials feel the need to 
manipulate their bottom line downward.   
The interaction between Pre-Transfer Income and Bond Issue is positive as expected 
but insignificant. At the same time, the interaction with Intergovernmental revenue 
and Pension Costs yielded negative coefficients significant at the 5% level. This 
suggests that municipalities with high a level of grant money or facing powerful 
unions transfer money out of the general fund to show smaller increases in the bottom 
line. This would be consistent with the notion that a smaller increase assists with the 
likelihood of grant continuation and minimizes labor demands.  
The interaction with Mayor on Council was positive and significant (   = .20 and 
t=2.52) as was the interaction with Standing Committee (   = .36 and t=2.59), 
Staggered Board (   = .23 and t=3.10), Frequency of council meetings (   = .11 and 
t=4.25) and the interaction with Business Executives (   = .72 and t=1.77). Taken 
together, this suggests that a more active council, one with business executives and 
with staggered terms tend to transfer more money into the general fund to cushion the 
bottom line. This could be that these council features force the elected officials to 
think about the long-term financial viability of the municipality and thus manage up 
increases the general fund balance. Interestingly though Council Term Limits, which 
would also measure the removal of reelection pressures, has a negative coefficient 
(   = .25 and t=4.10). This could be that even if elected officials have are term 
limited, they still have to worry about forthcoming contests before their limit.  
In Table 7, I rerun the interaction analysis of Table 3 with Discretionary Accruals of 




Discretionary Accruals (PTIDA) and the “citizen” variables is insignificant. 
Similarly, all of the council related interactions were also insignificant except for 
Council Term limits was produced a negative coefficient significant at the 10% level. 
Interestingly, the interaction with Pension Costs was positive and significant at the 
1% level. Overall, there was no consistent pattern in the enterprise fund results as 
there was in the general fund analysis in Table 6. This underscores that although the 
two funds faced the same institutions, only the general fund responded to those 
pressures.  
 9.4 Additional Analysis 
Thus far, evidence has been shown that the general fund systematically uses operating 
transfers to manipulate its bottom line down and this tendency is affected by certain 
institutional factors while the enterprise fund uses discretionary accruals manipulate 
its bottom line down. However, there could be other circumstances that contribute to 
this behavior. While showing too large an increase in the bottom line may draw 
unwanted attention from citizens and oversight agencies, showing a deficit can reflect 
poorly on management (Rupel, 2010). Therefore, I measure Deficit equal to 1 if Pre-
Transfer Income is negative. If managers are less inclined to show a negative change 
in fund balance, then they would transfer more money into a fund if it has negative 
Pre-Transfer Income. Similarly, because the budget is a legal governing document, 
there is a great emphasis in reaching budgeted figures (Rupel, 2010). I code Positive 
Variance 1 if the actual Pre-Transfer Income is greater than its budgeted value. The 
idea being that if Positive Variance is 1, then the managers could still transfer money 




In addition, Big 4 auditors have been shown in corporate literature to restrain earnings 
management and generally produce higher quality reports (DeAngelo, 1981 and 
DeFond and Jimbalvo, 1998). Baber et al, 2011 finds that clients of Big 4 auditors are 
less likely to restate their reports. I construct a binary variable, Big 4, if the 
municipality is audited by a Big 4 auditor.  
There have been many municipal papers exploring disclosure related questions. 
Municipal literature has often proxied disclosure quality for accounting quality 
(Evans and Patton, 1983). However, this claim has not been empirically verified. To 
the extent that a relationship exists between accounting disclosure and quality, 
accounting manipulation will change. In other words, if disclosure quality 
approximated accounting quality, then there would be little or no manipulation in to 
those cases. To examine this test, I proxy for disclosure using the GFOA certificate. 
This certificate, awarded by the government financial officers association, recognizes 
municipalities for the quality of their disclosures. The GFOA has a checklist of 
disclosures and presentation styles it looks for and if a municipal report meets the 
benchmark, it receives the award. This certificate has been regularly used to capture 
municipal disclosure (Evans and Patton, 1983, Evans and Patton, 1987 and Giroux 
and McLelland, 2003). In 77% of municipalities received the GFOA certificate. This 
is consistent with Giroux and McLelland (2003) who reported the figure to be at 88% 
percent in 1996.  
Panel A of Table 8 reveals that the interaction of Pre-Transfer Income and Deficit is 
positive as expected but insignificant. However, the interaction with Positive 




general fund is outperforming its budget, more money is transferred out so it can 
reach its budgeted figures.  The interaction with Big 4 was insignificant but the 
interaction with GFOA yielded positive coefficient significant at the 5% level. This 
suggests that general funds in municipalities with the GFOA certificate systematically 
have more net transfers for all levels of Pre-Transfer Income, perhaps to enhance the 
appearance of their financial condition. This would seem to indicate that there is 
divergence between disclosure quality and actual accounting quality.  
In Table B, a similar analysis is done for the enterprise fund. Since most 
municipalities do not disclose the enterprise fund’s budgeted information, I could not 
perform that test for enterprise funds.  none of the interactions produced a significant 
coefficient. The interaction with Deficit produced a negative coefficient significant at 
the 5% level. This suggests that when an enterprise has negative Pre-Transfer 
income, it has negative discretionary accruals to lower its bottom line. This could be 
similar to firm taking a “big bath,” whereby it takes additional charges in the current 
year if its target is unattainable. Also, interestingly, the interaction with Big 4 was 
positive and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that Big 4 do not restrain 
discretionary accruals as they do in the corporate setting. But it could also offer a clue 
into how auditors prioritize items in both settings. Perhaps they do not view accruals 
as consequential in this setting so they do not exert as much effort curtailing them.  
 9.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The general fund analysis thus far has used net transfers as the dependent variable and 




believe this sufficiently controls for economic reasons for transfers and for the 
expected transfers. However, in this section, I propose a model for net transfers and 
use the residual from that model, Discretionary Net Transfers, as the dependent 
variable for my analysis. The purpose is to directly isolate the portion of transfers 
unexplained by economic reasons to determine if it is being affected by Pre-Transfer 
Income. 
I propose a model where Net Transfers in a given year are explained by the change in 
Pre-Transfer Income, Beginning Fund Balance, Budgeted Net Transfers, and Pre-
Transfer Income and Beginning Fund balance in the governmental funds. I then use 
the same variables to model Transfers In and Transfers Out. I do the same procedure 
for enterprise net transfers except I use lagged net transfers instead of budgeted 
transfers because those figures are unavailable. I do not report the regression results 
but the R-squared of the net transfers general (enterprise) regression is 13.2% (5%). 
Table 9 Panel A reruns the general fund analysis of Table 2 except with Discretionary 
Net Transfers as the dependent variable. In Column 1, Discretionary Net Transfers is 
the dependent variable, Pre-Transfer Income (PTI) has a negative coefficient 
significant at the 1% level. In Column 2 when Discretionary Transfers In is the 
dependent variable, PTI is negative and significant at the 5% level. But when 
Discretionary Transfers Out is the dependent variable, PTI has a positive coefficient 
significant at the 1% level. Taken together, this corroborates the evidence in Table 2 
and further illustrates that as PTI rises, municipal officials both decrease the amount 




Panel B presents the same analysis for the enterprise fund. PTI is insignificant in all 
three specifications, which confirms the results of Table 3 that the enterprise fund 
does not use operating transfers to manipulate their reports. In Panel C, I attempt to 
determine if there is a interplay between how each fund uses its operating transfers 
and accruals to manage its financial information. For the general fund, I regress 
Discretionary Net Transfers on PTI, Discretionary accruals and an interaction 
between the two as well as the same controls from Table 2. The coefficient on the 
interaction is negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that for all levels of 
Pre-Transfer Income, as discretionary accruals increase, there are more negative 
discretionary net transfers.  
I do a similar analysis for the enterprise fund but since enterprise funds use 
discretionary accruals to manipulate, I regress Discretionary Accruals on PTI, 
Discretionary Net Transfers, an interaction between the two and the same controls as 
in Table 3. Again, the coefficient on the interaction is negative and significant at the 
10% level. Taken together, this suggests that in both funds, there is a substitution 
effect between the two methods. In the general (enterprise) fund where its preferred 
method of manipulation is operating transfers (discretionary accruals), those 
operating transfers (discretionary accruals) were used to offset the increases in 
discretionary accruals (net transfers).  
Thus far, I have provided evidence that the general but not enterprise fund uses 
operating transfers to manipulate their reports. However, there still could be the 
argument that either all funds that use the same accounting as the general fund behave 




manipulate or that transfers are used to subsidize other funds. Although I control for 
the other fund’s economic factors and do the discretionary net transfer analysis, if the 
latter was the case, then transfers would systematically be used to shift excess money 
to subsidize other funds as governmental fund Pre-Transfer Income increases. In 
order to test this explanation, I rerun the net transfer regressions of Table 2 using 
variables from the governmental funds. PTI loads insignificantly in all the models 
suggesting that operating transfers are uniquely used in the general fund to 
















Chapter 10: Conclusion 
I used construct a sample of 309 municipal-year observations to examine whether 
accounting manipulations occurred in municipal settings. The municipality objective 
is to provide services to the public using public funds. As a result, one of the goals of 
government accounting is to display accountability for those public funds. This leads 
to the municipal target being a small increase in its bottom line. I find that the general 
fund’s the bottom line is manipulated to show a small increase with the use of 
operating transfers. I also find that transfers were not used in the same manner for the 
enterprise funds, which operate similar to commercial entities. However, I do find 
that enterprise funds manipulate their bottom line with the use of discretionary 
accruals. I also attempt to model discretionary accruals for the general fund and show 
that their use does not systemically explain the general fund bottom line. 
I extend my analysis to factors that may affect this manipulating activity for each 
fund. In the general fund, I find evidence that citizen oversight tends is associated 
with the downward manipulation of the bottom line whereas governance features of 
the municipal council were generally associated with upward manipulation. Strong 
unions, proxied by pension costs, and high levels of grant money were also associated 
with downward manipulation. These factors did not generally affect the enterprise 
fund.  
The results have implications for municipal officials, the public at large, and other 
users of municipal accounting reports. While both the general and enterprise fund 
were shown to manipulate their reporting, each preferred a tool that was consistent 




enterprise fund, which has the option of using operating transfers as well, used 
discretionary accruals. Besides showing the sophistication of managers to 
simultaneously arrive at the same objective using different methods, it stresses the 
important of context in accounting manipulation studies. My findings suggest that 
understanding the institution, incentives and available accounting tools are important 
in such studies. 
My findings also show that the general and enterprise fund were affected by external 
forces differently with regards to accounting manipulation. Generally, the enterprise 
fund was not influenced by the same factors as the general fund. This suggests that 
the environment an entity is in critically affects its manipulation behavior. 
Additionally, even in the same organization, divisions are not uniformly affected by 
outside factors. This could lead to similar analysis of subdivisions on the corporate 
side. Corporate literature has assumed that the earnings management target is the 
same for the entire company. But perhaps future research can investigate if 
differences in target exist among the divisions and if smaller divisions or subsidiaries 
are deemed important enough to manage their earnings.  
For the general fund, I found that the voter oversight generally exacerbates the 
tendency to manipulate accounting numbers downward but governance features led to 
upwards manipulation. This could be that municipal officials attempt to make the 
municipality appear more viable when they have distance from the voters. In addition 
high levels of grant money and having strong unions led to downward manipulation. I 




fund. These finding should be interested to public policy setters in determining the 
proper municipal oversight structures. 
In addition, I found that disclosure was associated with increasing not decreasing the 
bottom line. The fact that municipalities with the better disclosure systematically 
manipulated their bottom line in any direction points to a divergence between 
disclosure quality and actual reporting quality. Therefore, an organization can have 
accounting quality in appearance but not in fact. I also find evidence that Big 4 
auditors do not restrain discretionary accruals in the same fashion they do for 
corporations, suggesting they audit the two of institutions differently. 
The results of my study provide understanding of the municipal reporting process. 
My results of my study are subject to the limitation of my sample. My sample is 
based on those municipalities that chose to reply to my email requesting financial 
data. To the extent that municipalities that selected to reply are systematically 
different from that that did not reply, my results may not be generalizable to all 
municipalities. My study also uses data from 2001 -2003. While, I believe my study 
underscores an important dimension of municipal reporting, such behavior could have 
been impacted by the run up to and the subsequent financial crisis. These questions 















To offer services to the 
public  To maximize profits 
Accounting Objective Safeguard public treasury, 
facilitate financial 
management and enforce 
public accountability  
FASB Concept 
Statement No.1 states: 
“Financial reporting 
should provide 
information about how 





owners for the use of 
enterprise resources 
entrusted to it.” So in 
corporations, the focus 
is on reporting 
earnings. 
   
Measurement Focus Current Resource Method-
record activity that affects 
current resources only 
Economic Resources- 
record activity that 
affects economic 
position of the firm 
Budget Budgets are legally 
binding and used to ensure 
safeguarding of public 
treasury.  
Budgeting is a 
planning document 
used by managers. It is 
not incorporated into 
the accounting system. 
Reporting Entity Report on funds. Each 
fund is a reporting entity. 
Funds are used to enhance 
accountability of public 
funds 
Corporation reports all 




Basis of Accounting Modified accrual 
accounting recognizes 
expenditures when 
incurred and revenues 
Full accrual basis is 






when recognizable and 
available. The extra 
condition on revenues 
ensures that only revenues 
that can be used to pay off 








Matching None--focus is not net 
income, but flow of 
resources 
Focus is net income so 
matching revenues and 
expenses is crucial 
aspect of accounting 
system. 
   





































 Appendix C- Variable Definitions 
Independent 
NetTransfersGF Operating Transfers In less Operating Transfers Out 
NetTransfersENT Operating Transfers In less Operating Transfers Out 
Dependent 
PreTransferIncome_GF 
The Surplus/Deficit, equal to the sum of revenues, less expenditures scaled by average general fund 
assets 
PreTransferIncome_Ent 
Income Before Transfers, equal to the  sum of revenues, less expenses  scaled by average enterprise 
fund assets  
Controls 
CityForm Coded 1 if the chief executive is the mayor 0 if it’s the city manager 
AssetRatio_GF The ratio of general fund assets to all governmental fund assets 
AssetRatio_Ent The ration of enterprise current assets to all governmental fund assets 
GF_Beginning Balance Beginning balance of the General Fund's Fund Balance scaled by average general fund assets.  
This controls for the size of the General Fund as well as its need for funding from other funds 
Ent_Beginning Net 
Assets Beginning balance of the Enterprise Fund's Net Assets scaled by average enterprise fund assets.   
This controls for the size of the General Fund as well as its need for funding from other funds 
OtherFinancingSources_
GF 




All other financing sources that flow into or out of the enterprise fund scaled by average general 
fund assets 
logpop The log of the municipality population in 2000 
Instituional Forces: Citizen Involvement 
PolComp The log of the following: the percentage of city council officials who ran for re-election but lost 
CouncilTermLimits Coded 1 if the municipality has term limits and 0 otherwise 
CitizenBoards Coded 1 if the City has citizen boards and 0 otherwise 
StaggeredCouncil Coded 1 if the municipality council has staggered terms and 0 otherwise 
Recall Coded 1 if the municipality has a recall provision 
Citizen Inititative Coded 1 if municipality has a citizen intitatitive provision 
Method of Election Coded 1 if mayor is elected directly by the citizens and 0 otherwise 
Mayor Term Length The length of the mayoral term 
Instituional Forces: External  
Municipal Bond Issue Coded 1 if Municipal issued a bond in the previous year 
Enterprise Bond Issue Coded 1 if Enterprise fund issued a bond in the previous year 
Intergovernmental 
Revenue 
Coded 1 if prior year Intergovt. revenue is in the top quintile of all intergovt. revenue and 0 
otherwise 
PensionCosts 
Coded 1 if prior year Excess Pension Costs are in the top quintile of all Excess Pension Costs and 0 
otherwise.  
Excess pension costs are the calculated as the error term from regressing pension costs on 
population. 
Instituional Forces: Council Features  
StaggeredCouncil Coded 1 if the city council has staggered terms and 0 otherwise 
Council Size The number of councilpersons on a municipal council 
FrequencyCouncilMeetin




BusinessExecOnCouncil Coded 1 if the city council has a business executive on it and 0 otherwise 
CouncilTermLimits Coded 1 if the City has term limits and 0 otherwise 
Standing Committees Coded 1 if number of standing committees is in the top quintile of and 0 otherwise 
Other Variables 
GFOA Certificate Coded 1 if the city received the GFOA certificate for excellence in reporting and 0 otherwise 
Big 4 Auditor Coded 1 if the city has a big 4  auditor and 0 otherwise 
Deficit Coded 1 if the general or enterprise fund has negative pretransfer income and 0 otherwise 





































Table 1  
 Descriptive 
Statistics  
Name  Mean   P25   P50   P75   N  
Population 
               
91,368.70  
              
31,872.00  
             
46,832.00  
               
68,652.00  
                
309  
CityForm 
               
0.34  
              
-    
             
-    
               
1.00  




               
0.1049  
              
(0.0200) 
             
0.0858  
               
0.2242  
                
309  
NetTransfers_GF 
               
(0.0993) 
              
(0.2333) 
             
(0.0635) 
               
0.0076  
                
309  
ChangeFundBal._GF 
               
0.0053  
              
(0.0762) 
             
0.0111  
               
0.0824  
                
309  
BegFundBal._GF 
               
0.6060  
              
0.4289  
             
0.6300  
               
0.7940  
                
309  
OtherFinSources_GF 
               
(0.0003) 
              
-      
             
-      
               
0.0051  
                
309  
AvgAssets_GF 
               
35,800.00  
              
8,735.14  
             
15,600.00  
               
29,800.00  
                
309  
AssetRatio_GF 
               
0.3943  
              
0.2573  
             
0.3599  
               
0.4872  




               
(0.1643) 
              
(0.3383) 
             
(0.1391) 
               
0.0000  




               
0.1893  
              
0.0075  
             
0.1415  
               
0.3649  




               
0.6240  
              
0.3866  
             
0.6465  
               
0.8117  




               
0.0255  
              
(0.0009) 
             
0.0185  
               
0.0359  
                
284  
NetTransfers_Ent 
               
0.0043  
              
(0.0045) 
             
-      
               
0.0073  




               
0.0322  
              
0.9589  
             
0.9970  
               
1.0405  
                
284  
BegNetAssets_Ent 
               
0.7794  
              
0.5554  
             
0.7056  
               
0.8761  
                
284  
OtherFinSources_Ent 
               
0.0023  
              
-      
             
-      
               
-      
                
284  
AssetRatio_Ent 
               
0.4248  
              
0.1547  
             
0.3115  
               
0.4881  
                
284  
AvgAssets_Ent 
               
304,000.00  
              
42,300.00  
             
67,800.00  
               
159,000.00  
                
284  
This table displays summary statistics for variables used in the analysis. All variables are defined in 








General Fund Net Transfers Analysis 
  Net   Net   Net   Negative 
VARIABLES Transfers Transfers Transfers Net Transfers 
          
Pre-Transfer Income GF -0.888*** -0.929*** -0.942*** 12.71*** 
(-8.323) (-13.89) (-13.63) (4.365) 
CityForm -0.00244 -0.00525 -0.373 
(-0.0933) (-0.172) (-0.550) 
GF Asset Ratio 0.184** 0.201** -0.887 
(2.574) (2.394) (-0.595) 
BegFundBalance_GF -0.314*** -0.347*** 0.988 
(-4.487) (-5.203) (0.521) 
OtherFinancingSources_GF -0.762*** -0.778*** 9.268*** 
(-4.297) (-4.262) (3.930) 
Population  -0.0428*** -0.0413** 1.078 
(-3.086) (-2.614) (1.496) 
Lag NetTransfers_GF 0.0579*** 0.0542* -3.097** 
(2.900) (1.693) (-2.113) 
PreTransferIncome_GovtFunds -0.00109 -0.00285 1.209 
(-0.0357) (-0.0878) (1.228) 
OtherFinancingSources_GovtFunds -0.0250 -0.0277 0.555 
(-0.951) (-1.023) (0.687) 
BegFundBalance_GovtFunds -0.00275 0.00128 1.270 
(-0.211) (0.0835) (1.398) 
PreTransferIncome_Ent 0.0294 -2.270 
(0.248) (-0.523) 
BegNetAssets_Ent 0.0599 -0.548 
(1.149) (-0.324) 
OtherFinancingSources_Ent_AA 0.135 -1.774 
(1.298) (-0.731) 
State Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0950*** 0.658*** 0.634*** -13.05 
(3.617) (4.172) (3.472) (-1.502) 
Observations 309 309 284 309 
R-squared 0.827 0.920 0.924 0.474 
This table presents Net Transfer analysis in the general fund. The dependent variable is Net Transfers 
in the general fund. It is regressed on pre-transfer income, variables capturing the financial condition 
of governmental and enterprise funds as well as other control variables, respectively.  Column 1 
excludes all control variables, Column 2 shows the effect of only the general fund and governmental 
fund control variables and column 3 adds enterprise fund control variables. Column 4 is a logit model 
where the dependent variable is 1 if NetTransfers in the general fund are negative with the same 
regressors. State and Year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. 
*,**,*** represent significance at the 1%,5% and 10% level respectively. All variables are as defined 









Enterprise Fund Net Transfers Analysis 
  Net   Net   Net   Negative 
VARIABLES Transfers Transfers Transfers Net Transfers 
          
PreTransferIncome_Ent 0.0577 0.0306 0.0216 7.187 
(0.271) (0.211) (0.150) (1.217) 
CityForm 0.00661 0.00873 -0.0443 
(0.704) (0.917) (-0.0685) 
Ent. Asset Ratio -0.000354 -0.000214 -0.0508 
(-0.177) (-0.111) (-0.385) 
BegNetAssets_Ent -0.0345 -0.0390 -0.851 
(-1.108) (-1.196) (-0.846) 
OtherFinancingSources_Ent_AA -0.268 -0.276 13.75 
(-1.250) (-1.293) (1.415) 
Population 0.00175 0.00385 0.206 
(0.502) (1.134) (0.680) 
LagNetTransfersENT 0.0260* 0.0241 -0.203 
(1.681) (1.561) (-0.193) 
PreTransferIncome_GovtFunds 0.00944 0.0105 -0.776 
(0.923) (0.914) (-0.920) 
OtherFinancingSources_GovtFunds 0.00356 0.00401 0.0492 
(0.466) (0.524) (0.0737) 
BegFundBalance_GovtFunds 0.00815 0.00812* -0.936 
(1.657) (1.793) (-1.273) 
Pre-Transfer Income GF 0.00267 -0.839 
(0.411) (-1.233) 
BegFundBalance_GF 0.0331** -1.434 
(2.429) (-1.326) 
OtherFinancingSources_GF -0.00824 -4.292** 
(-0.615) (-2.415) 
State Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0151*** 0.0160 -0.0253 -18.92 
(3.598) (0.360) (-0.542) 
Observations 284 284 284 239 
R-squared 0.252 0.386 0.399 0.205 
This table presents Net Transfer analysis in the enterprise fund. The dependent variable is Net 
Transfers in the enterprise fund. It is regressed on pre-transfer income, variables capturing the financial 
condition of governmental and general funds as well as other control variables, respectively.  Column 




governmental fund control variables and column 3 adds general fund control variables. Column 4 is a 
logit model where the dependent variable is 1 if NetTransfers in the enterprise fund are negative with 
the same regressors. State and Year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by 
municipality. *,**,*** represent significance at the 1%,5% and 10% level respectively. All variables 












Enterprise Fund Discretionary Accrual Analysis 
  Disc. Disc. Disc. 
VARIABLES Acc Acc Acc 
        
Pre-Transfer Income Before Disc Acc -0.715*** -0.860*** -0.691*** 
(-4.679) (-7.806) (-8.213) 




CityForm -0.00404 -0.0139** 
(-0.964) (-2.069) 
Population 0.00224 0.00581** 
(1.287) (2.601) 
State Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0386*** 0.00130 -0.0101 
(3.692) (0.0580) (-0.427) 
Observations 284 284 189 
R-squared 0.671 0.799 0.789 
This table presents discretionary accruals analysis in the enterprise fund. Discretionary accruals are 
calculated according to the Jones model. In column 1, discretionary accruals in the enterprise fund are 
regressed only on pre-transfer income before discretionary accruals. In column 2, Prior Year pre-
transfer income, City Form and Population are added as controls, while in the column 3, prior year 
discretionary accruals is added to controls. State and Year fixed effects are included. Standard errors 
are clustered by municipality. *,**,*** represent significance at the 1%,5% and 10% level 
















General Fund Discretionary Accruals Analysis 
  Disc. Disc. Disc. 
VARIABLES Acc Acc Acc 
        
Pre-Transfer Income Before Disc Acc -0.0509 -0.168 -0.177 
(-1.264) (-1.403) (-1.613) 




CityForm 0.00688 0.00378 
(0.659) (0.138) 
Population -0.00601 -0.0170 
(-0.846) (-1.116) 
State Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0579*** 0.113 0.357** 
(3.980) (1.478) (2.183) 
Observations 309 309 206 
R-squared 0.052 0.126 0.318 
This table presents discretionary accruals analysis in the general fund. Discretionary accruals are 
estimated as the residual from the regression of change in working capital on change in revenue and 
total other financing sources. In column 1, discretionary accruals in the general fund are regressed only 
on pre-transfer income before discretionary accruals. In column 2, Prior Year pre-transfer income, City 
Form and Population are added as controls, while in the column 3, prior year discretionary accruals is 
added to controls. State and Year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by 
municipality. *,**,*** represent significance at the 1%,5% and 10% level respectively. All variables 





















 Descriptive Statistics- Cross 
Sectional Variables  
Name  Mean   P25   P50   P75   N  
PensionCosts 
               
0.10  
              
0.03  
            
0.07  
               
0.14  




               
0.52  
              
-    
            
1.00  
               
1.00  




               
0.35  
              
-    
            
-    
               
1.00  




               
1.66  
              
0.90  
            
1.42  
               
2.17  
                
309  
PolComp 
               
0.18  
              
-    
            
-    
               
0.33  




               
0.17  
              
-    
            
-    
               
-    
                
309  
CitizenBoards 
               
0.93  
              
1.00  
            
1.00  
               
1.00  
                
309  
Citizen Inititatives 
               
0.82  
              
1.00  
            
1.00  
               
1.00  
Recall 
               
0.79  
              
1.00  
            
1.00  




               
0.30  
              
-    
            
-    
               
1.00  
                
306  
CityMgrSalary 
               
119,709.30  
              
100,000.00  
           
114,296.50  
               
134,992.00  
                
174  
Mayor on Council 
               
0.61  
              
-    
            
1.00  
               
1.00  




               
1.85  
              
-    
            
2.00  
               
3.00  
                
297  
Staggered Council 
               
0.75  
              
-    
            
1.00  
               
1.00  
                
306  
Business Executive 
               
0.20  
              
0.13  
            
0.19  
               
0.20  
                
102  
Frequency 
               
3.79  
              
4.00  
            
4.00  
               
4.00  




               
0.17  
              
-    
            
-    
               
-    
                
309  
            
This table displays summary statistics for variables used in the cross sectional analysis. All variables 










General Fund Cross Sectional Analysis 
             
VARIABLES Controls State FE Year FE Obs. R Squared 
CitizenBoards -0.400*** Yes Yes Yes 309 0.92 
(-3.643) 
CitizenInitiatives -0.259** Yes Yes Yes 294 0.898 
(-2.270) 
Recall -0.175 Yes Yes Yes 270 0.866 
(-1.429) 
CityForm -0.332*** Yes Yes Yes 309 0.931 
(-3.972) 
MayorTermLength -0.110*** Yes Yes Yes 306 0.928 
(-3.112) 
MethodMayorElection -0.219*** Yes Yes Yes 306 0.925 
(-2.759) 
Population -0.0926 Yes Yes Yes 309 0.921 
(-1.411) 
PolComp 0.195 Yes Yes Yes 288 0.918 
(0.890) 
BondIndebtedness 0.021 Yes Yes Yes 294 0.920 
(0.400) 
InterGovtRev -0.169* Yes Yes Yes 309 0.924 
(-1.948) 
PensionCosts -0.205** Yes Yes Yes 309 0.921 
(-2.337) 
MayorOnCouncil 0.203** Yes Yes Yes 306 0.924 
-2.52 
StandingCommittee 0.362*** Yes Yes Yes 309 0.923 
(-2.590) 
StaggeredCouncil 0.236*** Yes Yes Yes 306 0.92 
(3.145) 
CouncilSize -0.0135 Yes Yes Yes 309 0.919 
(-0.904) 
Frequency 0.117*** Yes Yes Yes 300 0.929 
(4.251) 
BusinessExec 0.722* Yes Yes Yes 103 0.933 
(1.771) 
CouncilTermLimits -0.250*** Yes Yes Yes 309 0.929 
(-4.153) 
This table presents cross sectional analysis in for the general fund. It replicates the analysis of Table 2 
but includes an interaction term. Each row presents the interaction of a different variable with the Pre-
Transfer Income variable in the general fund. The dependent variable is net transfers. For each model, 




omitted from the table. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. *,**,*** represent significance 



























































Enterprise Fund Cross Sectional Analysis 
         
VARIABLES Controls State FE Year FE Obs. R Squared 
CitizenBoards 0.180 Yes Yes Yes 284 0.806 
(0.680) 
CitizenInitiatives 0.0196 Yes Yes Yes 269 0.806 
(0.169) 
Recall 0.0351 Yes Yes Yes 281 0.8 
(0.284) 
CityForm -0.284 Yes Yes Yes 284 0.81 
(-1.072) 
MayorTermLength 0.0792 Yes Yes Yes 281 0.812 
(1.263) 
MethodMayorElection -0.255 Yes Yes Yes 281 0.809 
(-0.995) 
logpop -0.132 Yes Yes Yes 284 0.811 
(-1.086) 
PolComp -0.240 Yes Yes Yes 284 0.834 
(-1.34) 
BondIndebtedness 0.012 Yes Yes Yes 269 0.811 
(0.080) 
InterGovtRev 0.152 Yes Yes Yes 284 0.801 
(1.560) 
PensionCosts 0.248*** Yes Yes Yes 284 0.803 
(3.100) 
MayorOnCouncil 0.175 Yes Yes Yes 281 0.808 
(0.947) 
StandingCommittee 0.0202 Yes Yes Yes 188 0.866 
(0.146) 
StaggeredCouncil 0.263 Yes Yes Yes 281 0.808 
(0.770) 
CouncilSize -0.0809 Yes Yes Yes 281 0.813 
(-1.319) 
Frequency 0.172 Yes Yes Yes 275 0.812 
(1.473) 
BusinessExec -0.00677 Yes Yes Yes 90 0.833 
(-0.0246) 
CouncilTermLimits -0.288* Yes Yes Yes 284 0.817 
(-1.746) 
This table presents cross sectional analysis in for the enterprise fund. It replicates the analysis of Table 
4 but includes an interaction term. Each presents the interaction of a different variable with the Pre-




each model, state and year fixed effects are included. Control, intercept and main effect variables are 
calculated but omitted from the table. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. *,**,*** represent 


















































Panel A: General Fund 
              
VARIABLES Controls Included State Fixed Effects Year Fixed Effects N R Squared 
Deficit 0.107 Yes Yes 309 0.923 
(1.110) 
Big 4 Auditor 0.126 Yes Yes 309 0.920 
(1.271) 
GFAO 0.183** Yes Yes 309 0.924 
(2.273) 
Positive Variance -0.142** Yes Yes 309 0.872 
    (-2.043)         
Panel B: Enterprise Fund 
              
VARIABLES Controls Included State Fixed Effects Year Fixed Effects N R Squared 
Deficit -0.3157** Yes Yes 284 0.834 
(-2.080) 
Big 4 Auditor 0.516*** Yes Yes 284 0.828 
(3.124) 
GFAO -0.0745 Yes Yes 284 0.805 
(-0.404) 
This table presents additional analysis for the general and enterprise fund. In Panel A, the analysis of 
Table 2 is followed but an interaction term is included. Each row presents the interaction of a different 
variable with the Pre-Transfer Income variable in the general fund. The dependent variable is net 
transfers. In Panel B, the analysis of Table 4 is followed but an interaction term is included. Each row 
presents the interaction of a different variable with the Pre-Transfer Income variable in the enterprise 
fund. The dependent variable is discretionary accruals. For each model, state and year fixed effects are 
included. Control, intercept and main effect variables are calculated but omitted from the table. 
Standard errors are clustered by municipality. *,**,*** represent significance at the 1%,5% and 10% 












Discretionary Net Transfer Analysis 
Panel A: General Fund  
        
VARIABLES DiscNetTransGF DiscTransIn_GF DiscTransOut_GF 
        
Pre-Transfer Income GF -0.856*** -0.266** 0.201*** 
(-16.23) (-2.316) (4.301) 
CityForm 0.0495* 0.114* 0.0182 
(1.754) (1.830) (0.629) 
GF Asset Ratio 0.128** -0.291** -0.115** 
(2.132) (-2.548) (-2.122) 
BegFundBalance_GF -0.175*** 0.0233 0.0610 
(-3.121) (0.313) (0.899) 
OtherFinancingSources_GF -0.826*** -0.304*** 0.249*** 
(-4.157) (-2.656) (4.070) 
Population  -0.0479*** -0.00689 0.0475* 
(-3.683) (-0.357) (1.979) 
LagNetTransfersGF 0.117*** 0.152** -0.00624 
(4.649) (2.496) (-0.158) 
PreTransferIncome_GovtFunds -0.372*** -0.118** 0.0446 
(-11.34) (-2.407) (0.868) 
OtherFinancingSources_GovtFunds -0.0129 -0.0105 -0.00642 
(-0.478) (-0.403) (-0.208) 
BegFundBalance_GovtFunds 0.0113 0.0288 -0.00688 
(0.984) (1.233) (-0.457) 
State Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.557*** -0.0527 -0.567** 
(3.539) (-0.253) (-2.382) 
Observations 309 309 309 


















Panel B: Enterprise Fund 
        
VARIABLES DiscNetTrans_Ent DiscTransIN_Ent DiscTransOut_Ent 
        
PreTransferIncome_Ent -0.0615 -0.0877 0.0110 
(-0.557) (-0.810) (0.224) 
CityForm 0.00167 0.00310 0.000720 
(0.230) (0.402) (0.392) 
Ent. Asset Ratio -0.00175 -0.000442 -0.000650 
(-1.142) (-0.273) (-1.319) 
BegNetAssets_Ent -0.00720 -0.0159 -0.00853** 
(-0.304) (-0.693) (-2.413) 
OtherFinancingSources_Ent_AA -0.145 -0.129 0.00646 
(-1.079) (-1.069) (0.270) 
Population 0.00339 0.000558 -0.000907 
(1.079) (0.210) (-0.825) 
LagNetTransfersENT_wins 0.00374 -0.0139 0.0293*** 
(0.238) (-1.060) (5.390) 
PreTransferIncome_GovtFunds 0.00427 -0.00566 -0.00633 
(0.397) (-0.571) (-1.285) 
OtherFinancingSources_GovtFunds 0.00548 -0.00418 -0.000426 
(0.569) (-0.497) (-0.0872) 
BegFundBalance_GovtFunds 0.00451 0.000965 -0.00170 
(1.228) (0.305) (-1.315) 
State Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0167 0.00701 0.00797 
(-0.462) (0.211) (0.779) 
Observations 284 270 270 















Panel C: Substitution Analysis Both Funds 
  Variable     
General Fund  





R Squared 0.954 






R-squared 0.824     
Panel A reruns the analysis in Table 2 except the dependent variable is Discretionary Net Transfers. 
Discretionary Net Transfers are calculated as the residual when Net Transfers are regressed on the 
change in Pre-Transfer Income, Beginning Fund Balance, Budgeted Net Transfers, and Pre-Transfer 
Income and Beginning fund balance in the governmental funds. In column 1, the dependent variable is 
discretionary net transfers, in column 2 its discretionary transfers in and in column 3 its discretionary 
transfers out. Panel B reruns the analysis in Table 4 except with Discretionary Net Transfers for the 
enterprise fund.  Enterprise Discretionary Net Transfers are calculated as the residual when Net 
Transfers are regressed on the change in Pre-Transfer Income, Beginning Fund Balance, Prior Year 
Net Transfers, and Pre-Transfer Income and Beginning fund balance in the governmental funds.  In 
column 1, the dependent variable is discretionary net transfers, in column 2 its discretionary transfers 
in and in column 3 its discretionary transfers out.  In Panel C, the analysis examines a substitution 
effect between discretionary accruals and discretionary net transfers. First, for the general fund, the 
regression in Column 1 is rerun but with adding an interaction between Pre-Transfer income (PTI) and 
discretionary accruals. The dependent variable is discretionary net transfers. A similar regression is run 
for the enterprise fund. The dependent variable is discretionary accruals and the interaction term is 
between discretionary net transfers and Pre-Transfer Income before discretionary accruals (PTIDA). 
For each model, state and year fixed effects are included. Control, intercept and main effect variables 
are calculated but omitted from the table. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. *,**,*** 






Governmental Funds Net Transfer Analysis 
  Net   Net   Net   
VARIABLES Transfers Transfers Transfers 
        
PreTransferIncome_GovtFunds -0.00795 0.250 0.160 
(-0.0694) (1.417) (1.165) 
CityForm 0.0993 0.0490 
(0.965) (0.524) 
Govt Asset Ratio -0.0914 -0.0325 
(-0.468) (-0.164) 
BegFundBalance_GovtFunds 0.0533 0.0545 
(0.704) (0.696) 
OtherFinancingSources_GovtFunds 0.262* 0.172* 
(1.779) (1.670) 
Population 0.0146 0.0301 
(0.416) (0.866) 
Lag NetTransfers_Govt 0.389*** 0.482*** 
(2.801) (2.861) 
SurpDef_AA_wins -0.00539 -0.0204 
(-0.0540) (-0.215) 
BegFundBalance_GF 0.223 0.157 
(1.520) (1.163) 








State Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.814*** 0.326 0.173 
(29.63) (0.776) (0.418) 
Observations 309 309 284 
R-squared 0.316 0.433 0.553 
This table presents Net Transfer analysis in the governmental funds. The dependent variable is Net 
Transfers in the governmental fund. It is regressed on pre-transfer income, variables capturing the 
financial condition of general and enterprise funds as well as other control variables, respectively.  
Column 1 excludes all control variables, Column 2 shows the effect of only the governmental fund  




fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. *,**,*** represent 
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